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As cohabitation among unmarried couples becomes more
common in the United States,' a most pressing challenge
*Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. A.B., Cornell University;
J.D., Duke University. I thank June Carbone, Dan Cole, Robin Feldman, Tom Gal-
lanis, Susan Gary, Adam Hirsch, Brad Joondeph, Ron Krotoszynski, Larry Wag-
goner, and participants in a Bay Area junior law faculty workshop for their
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1 See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation:
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1265, 1268 n.11 (2001) (citing to United States census data indicating that from 1970
to 1998 the number of cohabiting opposite-sex couples increased from 523,000 to
4,236,000 and that "[i]n 1998, there were eight unmarried opposite-sex couples for
every 100 married couples, up from one per 100 in 1970); J. Thomas Oldham, Les-
sons from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S. Regulation of Heterosexual Co-
habitants Or, Can't Get No Satisfaction, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1412 (2001)
(concluding from studies indicating that cohabitation is "particularly popular among
.[2551
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facing inheritance law scholars, practitioners, and others who
concern themselves with the development of inheritance law is to
craft reforms that would, if implemented, better serve non-mari-
tal families while at the same time maintaining a reasonable ease
of administration of estates.2 One area in urgent need of such
reform is intestacy law.' Current intestacy law generally does not
the young" that "cohabitation will become an increasingly common family type in
the United States"); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treat-
ment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1435-36 (2001)
(commenting that "research suggests that cohabitation has become less of an 'en-
gagement' that serves as a prelude to marriage and more of an intimate arrangement
that may serve as an alternative to it" and that "[t]his is reflected, for instance, in the
declining percentage of cohabitors who eventually marry and in the fact that a por-
tion of the declining rate of marriage is due to the increasing rate of cohabitation");
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmar-
ried Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Ap-
proach, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 418 (1999) (reporting that in the past several decades
in the United States rates of marriage among unmarried women have declined while
rates of nonmarital childbearing and nonmarital cohabitation among unmarried
couples have increased rapidly). See also Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage
Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1,
16 (2000) [hereinafter Ellman, Divorce Rates] (describing a major decline in the U.S.
marriage rate from 1969 (149 marriages per 1000 unmarried women, fifteen to forty-
four years of age) to 1988 (91 marriages per 1000 unmarried women, fifteen to forty-
four years of age).
2 See Ellman, Divorce Rates, supra note 1, at 42 (remarking that "declining mar-
riage rates may suggest that the law's treatment of nonmarital families will be in-
creasingly important" and, more specifically, "[t]he persistence of gender roles
[within non-marital partnerships] may suggest that long-term relationships between
parties who have never formally married should ... be treated similarly to marriage,
because the parties' behavior may be little affected by the formalities with which
they commenced their relationship"); Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in
the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 94 (1996) ("One of the increas-
ingly notable shortcomings of modern probate law is its failure to provide adequate
guidelines governing the inheritance rights of children outside the traditional nu-
clear family."); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 83, 115-16, 155-56, 163 (1994) (in arguing for a posthumous duty to
support one's children, pointing out that permitting disinheritance of children dis-
proportionately disadvantages children reared outside the traditional family because
such children are less likely to benefit from their surviving parent taking a forced
share of their decedent parent's estate in that "the disinherited cohabitant receives
no statutory share which can trickle down for the children's benefit" and "in our
multiple marriage society the surviving spouse often is not the parent of the testa-
tor's minor children"); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-
Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 683, 687 (1992) [hereinafter Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage
Society] (noting that "[i]nevitably, this transformation of the family will increasingly
exert new tensions on traditional wealth-succession laws").
3 See Mary Louise Fellows, Pride and Prejudice: A Study of Connections, 7 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 455, 466 (2000) (asserting that "heirship laws can accomplish their
function if they conform to the notion of family as it evolves sociologically and not if
[Vol. 81, 2002]
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reflect as well as it could the way Americans today structure their
family lives.4 For example, the intestacy statutes of forty-seven
states make no provision for the survivor of a non-marital com-
mitted partnership.5
Committed partners can ameliorate the harshness of existing
law and protect each other from disinheritance with effective es-
tate planning.6 But many non-marital couples do not seek to do
so, either because they procrastinate or because they mistakenly
believe that the surviving partner will succeed to the decedent
partner's property under their state's intestacy statute.7 Moreo-
ver, even where the partners have attempted to execute an estate
plan that provides for the survivor of them, such a plan is subject
to possible challenge by a partner's intestate heirs, such as sib-
they are tied exclusively to a definition of family determined through legal
marriages").
4 See generally Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18
LAW & INEQ. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws]; Margaret M.
Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 917, 918, 928-36 (1989) (arguing that the exclusion of step-children from
intestate distribution "is unfair and inconsistent with the purpose of the intestacy
laws" and proposing reform that would bring step-children within intestacy scheme
where decedent stood in loco parentis with respect to the step-child).
5 Vermont accords to the surviving partner of a civil union intestate inheritance
rights equivalent to those it provides a surviving spouse. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§ 1204(a), (e)(1) (Supp. 2001). Hawaii provides to a surviving reciprocal beneficiary
a spouse's intestate share. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1, 560:2-102 (Supp. 2001).
And New Hampshire treats as a surviving spouse the survivor of an opposite-sex
non-marital partnership in which the partners cohabited and held themselves out as
husband and wife for at least a three-year period immediately preceding the intes-
tate's death. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992).
6 See Andrew R. Lee, Estate and Disposition Planning Issues for Same-Sex or
Other Unmarried Couples, TRUSTS & ESTATES 51 (Vol. 141, No. 1, Jan. 2002) (dis-
cussing need for unmarried couples to execute estate planning documents and take
advantage of inter vivos gifting techniques to protect the surviving partner); Rob-
bennolt & Kirkpatrick Johnson, supra note 1, at 434 ("In the absence of legislative
or policy reform ...[t]he preventive law emphasis on planning and prevention
through the use of legal instruments can be used to accurately reflect the goals and
circumstances of an unmarried committed couple.").
7 Robbennolt & Kirkpatrick Johnson, supra note 1, at 442 & n.132 (reporting the
results of a survey in which "33.3% of respondents with opposite-sex partners (6
respondents) and 45.5% of respondents with same-sex partners (45 respondents)
mistakenly believed that their partner would be among their heirs"); id. at 444 (re-
porting that of the "respondents [in a non-marital committed partnership] who
claimed to 'know' who would inherit their estate, 34 of 52 persons without wills
(65%) and 17 of 65 persons with wills (26%) [mistakenly] thought their partner
would inherit their estate" if they died intestate, and concluding that "many people
in unmarried committed partnerships without wills may not recognize the need
under existing laws to specifically designate their partner as the beneficiary of their
property if they so desire").
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lings or even more distant relations, whom the law deems to be
"natural" objects of an unmarried person's bounty.8
I have argued elsewhere in favor of revising Article II of the
Uniform Probate Code to grant intestate inheritance rights to the
intestate decedent's surviving committed but non-marital part-
ner.9 Reform of the Uniform Probate Code to provide such in-
testate inheritance rights would further Article II's principal goal
of promoting the donative freedom of the decedent.10 Further,
such reform could be undertaken without unreasonably under-
mining Article II's expressed subsidiary goals including a desire
for simplicity and certainty in the administration of estates.11
Moreover, reform of Article II to include recognition of non-
marital partnerships, and in particular gay and lesbian couples,
would serve an expressive function. 2 By including intestate in-
heritance rights for a surviving non-marital committed partner,
8 See generally E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhor-
rent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitra-
tion, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1999) (arguing that "cultural minorities have
cause to fear adjudication of their legal rights and responsibilities in a legal system
dominated by majority-culture personnel").
9 See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits
of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063(1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Expres-
sive Function].
10 Id. at 1067-76. See also T. P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the
Movement for Same-Sex Equality, 60 OHIo ST. L. J. 1513, 1523 (1999) (arguing that
the current Uniform Probate Code discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation
because it contains default rules that fail to effectuate the likely intent of gay, lesbian
and bisexual people).
I1 ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., REFORM OF THE INTESTATE SUCCESSION ACT, Fi-
NAL REPORT No.78 100 (1999) (rejecting the concern that adoption of its recom-
mended multi-factor approach to intestate inheritance rights for opposite-sex
unmarried partners would "unduly" complicate the administration of estates and
pointing out that "in other areas of the law, such as pension benefits, spousal sup-
port claims, and fatal accidents, it. is possible to determine if a particular person falls
into the class of cohabitant who is entitled to certain benefits or obligations");
Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1076-99. My review of Article II of the
1990 Uniform Probate Code concluded that Article II's six additional expressed val-
ues (in addition to the goal of promoting the decedent's donative intent) are (1) a
desire for simplicity and certainty in succession law, (2) a de-emphasis of formalism,
(3) a movement toward the unification of the subsidiary law of wills and will substi-
tutes, (4) an endorsement of the "marital-sharing" theory, (5) a responsiveness to
the changing nature of "family" and (6) a desire for multi-state uniformity in succes-
sion law. Id. at 1066.
12 See Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 275 (1994) ("Arguably, statutes governing inher-
itance should not only provide for the orderly distribution of property, but should
send messages regarding societal values such as the obligation of fathers to support
their children.").
[Vol. 81, 2002]
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an amended Article II would demonstrate that non-marital com-
mitted partnerships merit positive attention under succession
law.13 Thus, reform might alter how society views these partner-
ships and, indeed, how the committed partners view their own
relationship.14
The manner of identifying committed partners, as well as the
fact of recognition itself, has the potential to shape behavior, to
express societal support for the relationship, and to impact the
ease of administration, of estates. The different approaches to
identification reflect different weighing of values in this process.
Reform of intestacy law to include non-marital partners might
take one of several approaches: a registration scheme, a multi-
factor approach, or a combination registration/multi-factor
approach.
Pursuant to a registration scheme, the intestacy statute would
provide intestate inheritance rights to a surviving non-marital
partner only if the partners had registered their partnership as
prescribed by the statute prior to the intestate's death. For ex-
ample, Hawaii provides an intestate share to a surviving non-
marital partner where the partners had registered prior to the
intestate's death as reciprocal beneficiaries.' 5
The registration approach has the virtue of certainty. Under
the registration approach, a determination of who is entitled to
take an intestate share as a surviving non-marital partner re-
quires only an examination of the state's register for non-marital
partners. This approach avoids a subjective inquiry by the fact-
finder into the quality of the survivor's relationship with the in-
13 Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1099-106.
14 Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 8, 22, 90-91 (1998) [hereinafter Fellows et al., Committed
Partners] (supporting the assertion that intestacy statutes shape social norms and the
definition of family by pointing to the recognition by intestacy statutes of the right of
adopted children to take as heirs of the adopting parent's own ancestors and collat-
eral relatives and the effect of such recognition in breaking "the stranglehold blood
ties had on the definition of family"). See also Spitko, Expressive Function, supra
note 9, at 1100-01. Cf Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 13 ("With
respect to the type of family the intestacy statute supports, the definition of family
may reflect society's view both of what a family is and what a family should be.").
15 HAW. REv. STAT. § 572C-1 to -7 (Supp. 2001). Generally, Hawaii reserves re-
ciprocal beneficiary status for same-sex couples and for mixed-sex couples com-
posed of partners who are prohibited from marrying one another by reason of
consanguinity. See id. § 572C-4(3). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(1)
(Supp. 2001) (providing a spouse's share of the decedent's intestate estate to a same-
sex surviving non-marital partner who was the intestate's civil union partner).
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testate so as to determine whether the survivor merits recogni-
tion under the intestacy scheme. 16 A principal drawback of this
approach to reform, however, is its underinclusiveness. The re-
gistration approach fails to recognize the surviving non-marital
partner where the partners chose not to register or simply ne-
glected to do so. 7
A second approach to reform, that addresses the underinclu-
siveness concern, is the multi-factor approach.' 8 Pursuant to a
multi-factor approach, the non-marital partners need not have
registered their relationship in order that the survivor of them
might be entitled to a share of the intestate estate of the first of
them to die. Rather, the survivor may assert her entitlement to
an intestate share based upon the nature and quality of her rela-
tionship with the intestate. The court must then evaluate that
claim by considering whether the nature and quality of the claim-
ant's relationship with the intestate was such that it is appropri-
ate that she be awarded an intestate share. The intestacy statute
guides the court in making this subjective inquiry by setting out
factors that the court might find relevant and helpful in evaluat-
ing the quality of the partners' relationship.
The principal concern with the multi-factor approach is the ex-
tent to which a subjective inquiry might undermine certainty in
16 See Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640,1652-58 (1991)
(arguing that a registration system for recognition of "nontraditional adult relation-
ships" is preferable to a functional approach in that, unlike the latter, it avoids an
indeterminate and intrusive inquiry into the claimants' personal lives and avoids re-
quiring that "all alternative families resemble traditionally recognized relationships
in function, if not in precise form").
17 The partners might choose not to register their relationship for fear of discrimi-
nation they might suffer as a consequence of registration. To address this fear, the
intestacy statute might provide a non-disclosure option for registrants. That is, the
statute might provide that the state shall not disclose to the public the names of
registrants who express a preference that the fact of their registration not be dis-
closed to the public. Of course, this safeguard would not allay the fears of partners
who feared state discrimination against them based upon the nature of their rela-
tionship or their sexual orientation. As an alternative safeguard, the statutory
scheme might provide for truly private registration of non-marital partnerships for
the purposes of the intestacy scheme. See Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9,
at 1081-86 (arguing that a registration procedure for committed partners that did not
require public registration, but rather allowed partners to convey committed partner
status upon each other for the purposes of the intestacy statute by means of a writ-
ten unattested document, would be consistent with the Uniform Probate Code's
harmless error principle for the execution of wills).
18 See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59
Mo. L. REV. 21 (1994) [hereinafter Waggoner, Marital Property Rights].
[Vol. 81, 2002]
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administering the intestacy scheme. In a jurisdiction that allows
for a multi-factor inquiry, the property owner and her presump-
tive heirs might be less certain during the property owner's life as
to how her intestate estate will be distributed at her death.
Moreover, a court's multi-factor inquiry might require a large ex-
penditure of judicial resources as well as the expenditure by the
claimant and those who oppose her claim of a great deal of time
and financial resources.
To reduce the uncertainty of the multi-factor approach while
still avoiding underinclusiveness, a third approach to reform
combines a registration system with a multi-factor approach.1 9 In
allowing the partners to register their relationship, the combina-
tion or hybrid approach allows those who take advantage of the
registration process to ensure that the surviving partner will be
an intestate heir in the case of intestacy. Thus, the partners are
able to avoid the uncertainty and the delay and expense of a
multi-factor inquiry.
The combination approach seeks to maintain inclusiveness by
allowing for a multi-factor inquiry in cases in which an intestate is
survived by a putative non-marital partner but the partners did
not register the partnership during the intestate's life. In al-
lowing for such a multi-factor inquiry, the combination approach
introduces uncertainty in a reduced number of cases (as con-
trasted with a pure multi-factor approach) into administration of
the intestacy scheme. In cases in which the intestate had died
while unregistered but also in a relationship that arguably meets
the standard for a committed partnership set out in the intestacy
statute, the combination approach allows for the survivor to as-
sert a claim for an intestate share and, thus, to subject the admin-
istration of the intestate estate to whatever uncertainty and
expense arises with a claim under a pure multi-factor approach.2 0
19 See Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 64 (advocating this
type of dual registration/multi-factor approach); Spitko, Expressive Function, supra
note 9, at 1087 n.125 (citing to letters from Professor Lawrence Waggoner to various
law reform organizations in which Professor Waggoner, the drafter of a leading
multi-factor approach proposal, advocates the combination approach).
20 A combination approach jurisdiction might seek to further reduce uncertainty
by setting a higher burden of proof for a claimant who seeks to demonstrate her
surviving partner status pursuant to the multi-factor inquiry, in light of the fact that
the claimant and the decedent did not take advantage of a registration scheme avail-
able to them. The parties' failure to do so does suggest a greater likelihood that the
couple was not sufficiently committed such that the survivor should take an intestate
share.
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In this present Article, I now consider how one might best
structure a multi-factor approach (or the multi-factor component
of a combination approach) intestacy scheme granting intestate
inheritance rights to the surviving committed partner of an intes-
tate decedent. Two issues appear paramount. First, how should
the intestacy scheme qualify an individual as a surviving commit-
ted partner entitled to take an intestate share under the
scheme? 21 Second, to what portion of the decedent's intestate
estate should the qualifying surviving committed partner be enti-
tled? With respect to this second issue-the size of the surviving
committed partner's intestate share-the broad principles of the
proposal I offer in this Article, employing an accrual approach to
determining the size of the intestate share, and much of its sup-
porting analysis, would apply with equal force to determining the
size of an intestate share afforded to a committed partner pursu-
ant to an intestacy scheme that employs a registration approach.
Indeed, these broad principles and rationales underlying my pro-
posed accrual approach would apply also to the determination of
the size of an intestate share accorded to a surviving legal spouse.
My proposal derives from an emphasis on four values: For
both consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasons, which
are set out below, 22 I seek to promote the donative intent of the
intestate property owner, to reward the surviving partner who
contributed to the financial, physical, or emotional well-being of
the intestate, to protect the reliance interests of the surviving
partner, and to safeguard the ease of administration of estates.23
These values inform my proposal with respect to both the qualifi-
cation of a committed partner and the portion of the decedent's
intestate estate to which she is entitled.
With respect to the portion of the intestate estate to which a
surviving committed partner shall be entitled, I propose the use
of an accrual method. Pursuant to this approach, the size of the
intestate share awarded to a surviving committed partner is pro-
21 See American Law Institute Debates Domestic Partnership Agreements, 26 Fam.
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1352-53 (May 23, 2000) (reporting that the issue of when a
domestic partnership exists proved to be one of the most contentious issues at the
American Law Institute's 77th Annual Meeting discussion of the ALI's Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution with respect to the issue of how a court should deal
with the break-up of a domestic partnership).
22 For a discussion of consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches to an-
swering policy questions, see Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the
Theory of General and Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAx REV. 293 (2002).
23 See infra notes 59-146, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 81, 2002]
HeinOnline  -- 81 Or. L. Rev. 262 2002
Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners
portional to the duration of the committed partnership cohabita-
tion period.24 In addition, my intestacy scheme would allow for
the "ex-partner" of a decedent from a relationship that fractured
shortly before the decedent's death to claim an intestate share.
The ex-partner would be entitled to a portion of the intestate
estate proportional to the duration of the partnership cohabita-
tion period discounted in proportion to the time elapsed between
the fracture and the intestate's death.25 Moreover, I would apply
the accrual/multi-factor approach to govern the passing of intes-
tate property even in cases in which the decedent committed
partner died partially testate.26 To promote certainty and ease of
administration, however, my proposal would,. in certain circum-
stances, deny standing to a claimed committed partner to chal-
lenge a decedent's will when the surviving committed partner
cannot demonstrate that she and the decedent cohabited in a
committed partnership for nine years or greater duration.27
With respect to the qualification of a committed partner, my
proposal asks the court to focus its inquiry on twenty-three enu-
merated factors that directly implicate the values that my pro-
posed intestacy scheme seeks to promote.28 The presence of
these factors tends to indicate that the claimant and the decedent
lived life together as a couple in an emotionally and physically
intimate partnership, that the decedent would want the survivor
to take an intestate share, that the survivor contributed to the
decedent's financial, physical or emotional well-being, or that the
survivor had come to rely upon the decedent for her financial
security. I group these factors accordingly to focus the court's
inquiry on the underlying values. My proposal limits the ability
of a court to consider one arguably relevant factor-the sexual
exclusivity of the parties' relationship-because I have serious
concerns about the use of such a factor. My proposal requires
that "[i]f the court finds that the parties lived together in a sexu-
ally exclusive relationship during their cohabiting partnership,
the court shall weigh this factor in favor of finding that the par-
ties lived life together in an emotionally and physically intimate
partnership" but the court may not otherwise consider evidence
24 See infra notes 147-74, and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 175-91, and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 192-99, and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 200-08, and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 240-65, and accompanying text.
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relating to the sexual exclusivity of the parties' relationship. 9
Finally, my proposal also includes the objective requirement of
a three-year minimum duration for the cohabiting committed
partnership before a surviving partner may assert a claim for a
share of the intestate decedent's estate. This requirement greatly
promotes certainty by narrowing the pool of potential claimants
and eliminating those potential claimants most likely to have a
weak or borderline claim. The minimum duration also is well
grounded in the intent, reliance, and reciprocity rationales of my
scheme.3"
In the remainder of this Article, I set out the details of and the
rationale for my proposed accrual/multi-factor approach to intes-
tate inheritance rights for unmarried committed partners. Part I
of the Article sets out, as a starting point for discussion, Profes-
sor Lawrence Waggoner's leading multi-factor proposal for inclu-
sion of unmarried committed partners within the intestacy
scheme.3 In Part II of the Article, I discuss my choice of values
to ground my proposed reform.32 In Part III, I set out an accrual
method for calculating the portion of the intestate estate to
which the surviving committed partner is entitled and explain
how this accrual method promotes the values of donative intent,
reliance, reciprocity, and ease of administration.33 Finally, in
Part IV of the Article, I discuss how these values relate to the
factors I have chosen to be used for the qualification of a surviv-
ing committed partner.34
I
A STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSION: PROFESSOR
WAGGONER'S WORKING DRAFT
In thinking through these issues-who shall qualify as a com-
mitted partner and what portion of the decedent's intestate es-
tate shall they take-I need not work from scratch. Indeed,
Professor Lawrence Waggoner has set forth as a "Working
Draft"35 an influential and leading American proposal to reform
29 See infra notes 266-85, and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 211-39 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 57-146 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 147-208 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 209-85 and accompanying text.
35 Professor Waggoner has set out the most recent version of his proposal, which
he offers as an amendment to the Uniform Probate Code, in a "Working Draft"
(Vol. 81, 2002]
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intestacy law to include intestate inheritance rights for unmarried
committed partners by means of a multi-factor approach.36
An interesting feature of the Waggoner Working Draft is that
it does. not apply at all in cases of partial intestacy. The Working
Draft provides an intestate share for a surviving committed part-
ner only where an "adult decedent dies without a valid will."37
Thus, if the decedent dies with a valid will that fails to dispose of
all of her probate property, the decedent's property that passes
by intestacy is not governed by the Working Draft.38
The Working Draft divides surviving committed partners into
two groups for the purposes of determining the portion of the
intestate estate to which the surviving committed partner is enti-
tled. In cases in which the decedent is not survived by either a
descendant or a parent, and in cases in which the decedent is
survived by one or more descendants, all of whom are also de-
scendants of the surviving committed partner, the survivor is en-
titled to the first $50,000 of the intestate estate and, in addition,
to one half of the remainder of the intestate estate.39 In all other
cases, the Working Draft provides to a surviving committed part-
ner one half of the decedent's intestate estate.4 °
As is generally the rule with extant intestacy statutes, the
Working Draft does not take into account the duration of the
relationship between the intestate and the heir in determining
dated January 1995 [hereinafter Working Draft]. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET
AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS AND Fu-
TURE INTERESTS, 108-09 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY
PROPERTY LAW]. Professor Waggoner's revised Working Draft is set forth in Ap-
pendix A.
36 See generally Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18. See also
ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., supra note 11, at 103-06, 116, 118, 123 (discussing the
Waggoner Working Draft and recommending adoption of several of its features).
37 Infra Appendix A § (a).
38 Professor Waggoner designed the Working Draft not to apply in cases of partial
intestacy "to reduce the risk that an older widow and widower who livedtogether
for convenience or to save expenses or for companionship, etc., would.., get caught
by the statute." His assumption was that each might have a will favoring each's own
children from a former marriage, that neither would want any property to go to the
survivor, and that any partial intestacy would be inadvertent. E-mail from Lawrence
W. Waggoner, Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School to Gary Spitko, Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law,
Dec. 28, 2001 (on file with author).
39 Infra Appendix A § (a)(1). The Working Draft brackets the $50,000 figure,
denoting that this figure is a recommended amount but a legislature might wish to
provide for a lesser or greater amount. See id.
40 Infra Appendix A § (a)(2).
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the portion of the intestate share to which the heir is entitled.4
Under the Working Draft, the duration of the committed part-
nership is irrelevant to the size of the intestate share that the
surviving partner takes. For example, all else being equal, the
surviving partner of a thirty-year committed partnership takes a
share equal to that taken by the surviving partner of a three-year
committed partnership.
Moreover, under the Working Draft, the surviving partner of a
long-term committed partnership takes less than a surviving legal
spouse of a short-term marriage would take pursuant to the Uni-
form Probate Code under otherwise similar circumstances.42 For
example, as noted above, under the Working Draft, when the de-
cedent is survived by a committed partner but is not survived by
a parent or a descendant, or is survived by one or more descend-
ants all of whom are also descendants of the surviving committed
partner, the survivor is entitled to the first $50,000 of the intes-
tate estate plus one half of the remainder of the intestate estate.43
The Uniform Probate Code would give to a legal spouse in these
circumstances the entire intestate estate.44
Indeed, for an intestate estate of any given size greater than
$50,000, under the Working Draft no surviving committed part-
ner would ever take a share of her partner's intestate estate as
large as that given to a surviving spouse pursuant to the Uniform
Probate Code's intestacy provisions. The best that a surviving
committed partner might do under the Working Draft is to take
the first $50,000 of the decedent's intestate property plus one-
half the balance of the intestate estate. In contrast, the worst
that a surviving spouse might do under the Uniform Probate
Code's intestacy provisions is to take the first $100,000 of the de-
cedent's intestate property plus one-half the balance of the intes-
tate estate.45
41 But see CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 2002) (requiring that a child/foster par-
ent or child/step-parent relationship have begun during the child's minority in order
for a parent/child relationship to exist with respect to such a parent and child for
purposes of intestate succession).
42 See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 1997) (providing for the
intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse).
43 See supra note 39, and accompanying text. See also infra Appendix A § (a).
44 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1) (amended 1997).
45 See id. § 2-102(4) (providing to a surviving spouse the first $100,000 of the in-
testate estate plus one-half the balance of the intestate estate in cases where the
decedent spouse is survived by descendants who are not descendants of the surviv-
ing spouse).
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Professor Waggoner intended for his Working Draft to be less
rewarding to a surviving committed partner than is parallel intes-
tacy law with respect to a legal spouse "to maintain the incentive
to enter into a formal marriage. '"46 Professor Waggoner ac-
knowledges that this disparate treatment of committed partners
and legal spouses might be inappropriate with respect to those
committed partners who are unable to marry each other on ac-
count of their sex.47 He suggests, therefore, that it may be appro-
priate for an intestacy statute to provide for a larger share to the
survivor of a same-sex committed partnership as contrasted with
the share provided to the survivor of a mixed-sex committed
partnership.48
In determining who shall qualify as a surviving committed
partner, the Working Draft first sets out several objective re-
quirements intended to narrow the pool of potential claimants,
thus, lessening the burden on the probate system and limiting the
amount of uncertainty introduced by this reform of the intestacy
scheme. 49 First, no claim for a committed partner's share may be
filed against the intestate estate of a decedent who was a minor
or who was married at her death.5" In addition, the claimant her-
self must have been an adult unmarried to anyone at the dece-
dent's death but must not have been prohibited by law from
marrying the decedent by reason of consanguinity.5 Finally, the
46 Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 80.
47 Id. at 80 n.143.
48 Id. The lesser award to a committed partner under the Working Draft can be
justified also on the ground that it is easier to be confident concerning the nature of
a decedent's relationship with a spouse as contrasted with a decedent's relationship
with a (non-registered) committed partner. But see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.12, cmt. b (2002)
stating that:
The precise rates chosen by the rulemaker under Paragraphs (1) and (2)
[for recharacterizing a spouse's separate property as marital property de-
pending on the duration of the marriage] are not compelled by any funda-
mental principle and are therefore not specified in this section. The
rationale for § 4.12 does suggest bounds, however. In the ordinary case of
a marriage that has lasted for 30 or 35 years, spouses will have made many
important and largely irreversible life decisions premised upon a shared
economic fate, including shared access to assets either brought into their
marriage. By that time, a complete recharacterization of separate property
the parties held at the time of their marriage is therefore appropriate as the
default rule.
49 See infra Appendix A § (b); Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18,
at 81-82.
50 Infra Appendix A § (a).
5 1 Id. § (b)(i) & (ii).
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claimant must have been "sharing a common household" with
the decedent at the decedent's death.52
Having thus narrowed the pool of potential claimants, the
Working Draft next calls for a subjective inquiry into whether the
claimant was living in a "marriage-like relationship" with the de-
cedent at the decedent's death.53 The Working Draft sets out six
factors that a court should consider, among others that the court
might find relevant, in deciding whether the decedent and the
claimant enjoyed a "marriage-like relationship."54 Finally, the
Working Draft provides for a rebuttable presumption that the
relationship at issue was "marriage-like" if the claimant and the
decedent engaged in one or more of four specified behaviors:
sharing a common household for a prescribed minimum period,
registering as domestic partners, participating in a commitment
ceremony certified in writing by an organization, and co-parent-
ing a child together.55
Professor Waggoner offered his proposal "as a starting point
for discussion" with the hope that it would spark dialogue about
the need for reform of intestacy statutes and the best approach to
such reform.56 In that spirit, in this Article, I use the Waggoner
Working Draft as my "starting point for discussion" of how a ju-
risdiction might best structure an intestacy statute that utilizes a
multi-factor approach to provide inheritance rights to a surviving
non-marital committed partner. My proposal for reform, which
is set forth in Appendix B, borrows much from Professor Wag-
goner's Working Draft. As set out below, however, my proposal
departs from the Working Draft in numerous important respects.
52 Id. § (b)(iii).
53 Id. §§ (b)(iii) & (d).
54 Id. § (d). Professor Waggoner's Working Draft was greatly influenced by case
law in the factors that it cites as relevant to a court's determination as to whether a
relationship was "marriage-like." In particular, the Working Draft borrows heavily
from the courts' decisions in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) and
in Warden v. Warden, 676 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). See Waggoner, Marital
Property Rights, supra note 18, at 76-80. Professor Waggoner also relied in crafting
his proposal upon similar proposals set forth by the Queensland Law Reform Com-
mission and upon Sweden's Law on Cohabitant's Mutual Home. See id. at 78 n.141.
55 Infra Appendix A § (e). The respondent may rebut the presumption by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence if the claimant has established only one of the four listed
behaviors. The respondent may rebut the presumption only by clear and convincing
evidence if the claimant has established more than one of the four listed behaviors.
Id. § (f).
56 Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 78.
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II
THE VALUES THAT SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE
INTESTACY PROVISIONS RECOGNIZING
COMMITTED PARTNERS
In designing any intestacy scheme, one might do well to start
by considering the values that the intestacy scheme will seek to
further.57 I begin, therefore, by asking what values should be
served by an intestacy scheme's provisions that recognize the de-
cedent's surviving committed partner. As noted above, I seek to
design an intestacy scheme that would serve four principal val-
ues: donative freedom, reciprocity, reliance, and ease of
administration.58
A. Donative Intent
There is widespread acceptance among succession law scholars
that it is and should be an important goal of any intestacy scheme
to further the donative intent of the intestate property owner.5 9
57 See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 13 (2000) ("At issue in
thinking about intestacy statutes is not only what a decedent wants, but what society
wants. Should family be supported, and if so, should a statute attempt to determine
the decedent's view of who his or her family is, or should the statute create a defini-
tion of family based on a societal view of family?").
58 Additional principles that have been cited as common goals or limitations of
intestacy statutes include strengthening family, encouraging the accumulation of
wealth, maintaining the dominance of the private property regime, promoting re-
spect for the legal system, and avoiding excessive complication of property titles and
excessive subdivision of property. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at
9: id. at 27 ("Intestacy statutes attempt to distribute a decedent's property to the
decedent's family, either because the intestacy statute strives to approximate the
decedent's wishes or because society has decided that intestacy statutes should bene-
fit and strengthen families if a decedent does not express a contrary wish in a will.");
Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are,
Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REv. 517, 546 (1994) (suggesting that allowing a
parent who has abandoned her minor child to take an intestate share from the
child's estate undermines the perceived fairness of the legal system); Fellows et al.,
Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 8 (commenting that intestacy statutes "reflect
society's commitment to: (1) donative freedom; (2) equity, meaning concerns about
fairness and protection of reliance interests; and (3) family"); id. at 12 (stating that
intestacy statutes seek to distribute intestate property in a manner that expectant
takers believe to be fair, thus, avoiding "disdain for the legal system"); id. at 13 n.62
(identifying as additional objectives of intestacy laws avoiding the excessive subdivi-
sion of property and related complicated property titles, and encouraging the private
accumulation of wealth).
59 Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 7 ("The most commonly identi-
fied goal of intestacy statutes is to create a dispositive scheme that will carry out the
probable intent of most testators."); Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note
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The first goal of my proposed intestacy statute reform, therefore,
is to promote better the donative intent of the intestate who has
died survived by a non-marital committed partner.6" The intes-
tate distribution scheme should seek, to some great degree, to
distribute intestate property to the committed partner as the
property owner would have provided had she thought about the
matter and set forth her wishes. 6
Recent empirical work by Professor Mary Louise Fellows and
her colleagues at the University of Minnesota strongly supports
the proposition that reform of intestacy law to recognize the in-
heritance rights of surviving committed partners would better
promote the intent of the intestate who has died while in a non-
marital committed partnership.6" Professor Fellows and her col-
leagues surveyed and reported on the attitudes of several groups
with respect to the provision of intestate inheritance rights for
unmarried committed partners. 63 In general, the Fellows survey
found that a substantial majority of the respondents in each re-
spondent group-those living in a committed non-marital part-
nership, as well as a substantial majority of the general public-
would prefer that a surviving committed partner take as an heir a
portion of the decedent partner's intestate estate.64
B. Reciprocity
A second goal of my proposed intestacy scheme reform is to
promote the norm of reciprocity as it relates to the actions of the
committed partners during the course of their partnership. That
is, the intestacy scheme should seek to reward or compensate
those committed partners who assisted the intestate in the ac-
14, at 8 (commenting that intestacy statutes reflect society's commitment to donative
freedom).
60 See Gallanis, supra note 10, at 1522 (arguing that the Uniform Probate Code's
intestacy provisions, as well as the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and the Uni-
form Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, "cry out for reform" because
they fail to fulfill their stated objective "to mirror the likely intent of the [gay or
lesbian] patient, ward or decedent").
61 Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 7-8 ("To the extent possible,
the statute should distribute the property to the persons the decedent would have
chosen to receive the property if the decedent were making the decision.").
62 See generally Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14.
63 The four groups that Professor Fellows and her colleagues surveyed were (1)
the general public, (2) persons in a committed non-marital mixed-sex relationship,
(3) men in a committed same-sex relationship, and (4) women in a committed same-
sex relationship. Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 9.
64 Id. at 89.
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cumulation of her wealth or who provided for the intestate's
physical, emotional or financial needs.65 One justification for in-
corporating the value of reciprocity into intestacy provisions rec-
ognizing unmarried committed partners is the notion that the
surviving committed partner earned a portion of the intestate
property through her contributions to the decedent partner, and
their partnership, even though the property was acquired by the
decedent partner and titled in the decedent's name.66 A second
justification for incorporating reciprocity is the aspiration that
the intestacy statute will promote a better society to the extent
that it recognizes, rewards and, thus, promotes care-taking be-
haviors. And it makes sense that the contributor/caretaker be
rewarded from the estate of the person who received her contri-
bution or care-taking.
American succession law incorporates this value of reciprocity
to only a slight degree. One important example of modern suc-
cession law's concern with reciprocity is found in the 1990 Uni-
form Probate Code's elective share.67 In general, an elective
share, also known as a forced share, allows a surviving spouse to
assert a claim for a portion of the decedent spouse's estate even
where the decedent spouse intentionally disinherited the surviv-
ing spouse. 6 8 The traditional rationale for such protection
65 See id. at 14 (describing the view that intestacy law "is part of a state's statutory
scheme to support family functions, such as child rearing and mutual financial re-
sponsibility" and concluding that "[w]ithin this understanding of intestacy, a recogni-
tion of inheritance rights for surviving committed partners would further the state's
objectives"); Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity,
and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 588 (1999) ("[A] devise flows natu-
rally as the final act of reciprocity in an ongoing relationship-inheritance is viewed
as a statement of reward, and so long as family members have taken care of each
other, they expect the reciprocal nature of the relationship to continue to the end");
Francis H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model From China,
1999 Wis. L. REV. 1199, 1257 [hereinafter Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance]
(criticizing American inheritance law for failing to reward those who supported the
decedent and concluding that "mechanical status-based rules prevail at the expense
of individual justice").
66 See Monopoli, supra note 12, at 286 (discussing the theories of Locke and John
Stuart Mill tying rights over private property to the exertion of labor in acquiring
that property in support of her argument that parental intestate inheritance from a
child can be justified when a parent has "invest[ed] time, energy and money in rais-
ing" the decedent child, but cannot be justified on the basis of expended labor where
the parent had failed to support or abandoned the child).
67 See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 through 2-212 (amended 1997).
68 Traditional elective share statutes differed as to whether the surviving spouse
could assert a claim only against the decedent's probate estate (property passing by
will) or also against the decedent's property passing by will substitutes.
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against disinheritance was to ensure some means of support for
the surviving spouse and to guard against the surviving spouse
becoming a public charge.69
The primacy of the support rationale for the elective share has
given way to some degree in recent years, however, to a reciproc-
ity rationale."0 The modern notion, sometimes labeled the "part-
nership theory of marriage," is that the surviving spouse who
contributed to the accumulation of the decedent's property is en-
titled, in light of that contribution, to a share of that property at
the decedent's death regardless of how the property was titled.7"
The general comment to the 1990 Uniform Probate Code's elec-
tive share explains that, pursuant to this rationale, "the law
grants each spouse an entitlement to compensation for non-mon-
etary contributions to the marital enterprise, as 'a recognition of
the activity of one spouse in the home and to compensate not
only for this activity but for opportunities lost."' 72
The structure of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code's elective
share reflects the ascension of this reciprocity rationale.73 Prior
to the 1990 revisions, the Uniform Probate Code's elective share
allowed the surviving spouse to claim a one-third share of the
decedent spouse's estate, regardless of the duration of the mar-
69 Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-
Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the De-
ferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 493 n.29 (2000).
70 See Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal
Estate Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49 U. MIAMi L. REV. 567, 577-82 (1995) [here-
inafter Gary, Marital Partnership Theory] (identifying the need and marital partner-
ship rationales as the "two main theories" that serve as rationales for the elective
share and discussing these rationales).
71 See Newman, supra note 69, at 493 n.29.
72 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general
cmt. (amended 1997), quoting Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family
Law 131 (1989).
73 See id. (stating that the principal goal of the 1990 revisions to the Uniform
Probate Code's elective share provisions was "to bring elective-share law into line
with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership"). The 1990
Uniform Probate Code's elective share remains concerned also with the spouses'
mutual duty of support. Section 2-202(b) provides a surviving spouse with a "sup-
plemental elective-share amount," suggested to be $50,000, related to the surviving
spouse's actual needs but unrelated to the duration of the marriage-that is, unre-
lated to the contribution of the surviving spouse to the decedent's accumulation of
her property. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(b) (amended 1997); UNIF. PROB3ATE
CODE Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 1997)
("The redesigned elective share system implements the support theory by granting
the survivor a supplemental elective-share amount related to the survivor's actual
needs.").
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riage. This flat percentage approach failed to implement well the
partnership principle. The spouse of a very short-term marriage,
who had contributed very little to the accumulation of the dece-
dent's wealth, and the spouse of a very long-term marriage, who
had contributed greatly to the accumulation of most or all of the
decedent's wealth, were entitled to the same portion of their re-
spective decedent spouse's estate.74
In contrast, the 1990 Uniform Probate Code's elective share
better implements the partnership theory by using an elective
share-percentage that increases as the duration of the marriage
increases.7 1 This elective-share percentage is then multiplied by
the value of the "augmented estate., 76  Credits are then sub-
tracted from the product to give the amount from the decedent's
estate to which the survivor is entitled.77 Thus, all else being
equal, the surviving spouse of a long-term marriage will be enti-
tled to assert a claim for a greater share of the decedent spouse's
estate as compared to the claim of the surviving spouse of a
short-term marriage.78
74 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general
cmt. (amended 1997) (illustrating this point with several fact scenarios under con-
ventional elective share law).
75 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a) (amended 1997) (setting forth the sched-
ule for the elective-share percentage).
76 Id.; see also id. at §§ 2-203 through 2-208 (setting out the composition of the
augmented estate).
77 Id. § 2-209.
78 For an exploration of how the modern Uniform Probate Code elective share
statute falls short in implementing the partnership theory of marriage and a proposal
to better implement the partnership theory into elective share law using a deferred-
community property scheme, see generally Newman, supra note 69. See also Gary,
Marital Partnership Theory, supra note 70, at 588-89 (acknowledging that the Uni-
form Probate Code's elective share "facilitates planning and avoids wasting judicial
resources on tracing problems and support suits" but criticizing that "the arbitrary
nature" of the accrual approach allows for subjecting separate property to the elec-
tive share in certain cases, notably in the case of a late-in-life marriage that lasts
fifteen or more years, and fails to subject marital property to the elective share in
other cases, notably where the survivor's "independent wealth is greater than that of
the marital estate"). Professor Gary proposes as an alternative that would better
implement the marital partnership theory beginning by defining the elective share's
augmented estate by reference to the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes, and then (1) subtracting out from the gross estate the value of the dece-
dent's separate property "to the extent feasible" and using the federal estate tax
code to help in identifying separate property, and (2) recapturing into the gross es-
tate certain property including certain gifts made to others than the surviving spouse
by the decedent within three years of the decedent's death, certain insurance pro-
ceeds paid as a result of the decedent's death, tort claims related to the decedent's
death and payable to the surviving spouse not otherwise included within the dece-
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The reciprocity norm also may well be playing a role in many
will contests.79 Professor Melanie Leslie theorizes that judges
and juries adjudicating will contests seek to vindicate a social
norm of reciprocity-that family members who care for and sup-
port a close relative or otherwise are actively involved in the
close family member's life can expect to receive an inheritance
from the relative and can rely upon that expectation."' This reci-
procity norm supports the expectation that a testator will disin-
herit her closest relatives in favor of a non-relative only where
those relatives have failed to provide care for the testator and,
instead, one or more non-relatives have performed the nurturing
"family" roles that society expects family members to play."1
This reciprocity norm has the virtue of encouraging family mem-
bers to support each other, albeit out of an expectation that the
supporting family member herself will enjoy reciprocal support
in the future.82
Professor Leslie argues that the fact-finder in a will contest is
likely to believe that a testator who has disinherited a close rela-
tive has broken an implied promise to the family member where
the family member had acted in accordance with the reciprocity
norm. 3 The fact-finder, therefore, will set aside the will that vio-
lates the reciprocity norm, thus allowing the family member to
take a share of the decedent's intestate estate. 4 On the contrary,
dent's gross estate, and all marital property owned by or controlled by the surviving
spouse. Id. at 589-603. Professor Gary seeks to leave the surviving spouse with one-
half of the marital property by giving to the surviving spouse an elective share equal
to fifty percent of the augmented estate minus offsets including marital property
already owned by the surviving spouse, and property passing to the surviving spouse
at the decedent's death. Id. at 603.
79 See generally Leslie, supra note 65.
80 Id. at 558-59.
81 Id. at 571.
82 Id. at 583.
83 Id. at 586 ("Courts intuitively understand that the testator may have obtained
benefits by implying a promise to reciprocate by leaving relatives a share in her
estate.").
84 Id. at 558-59, 587, 590. Professor Leslie bases her conclusions on her examina-
tion of more than 160 will contest cases decided within a five-year period. Id. at 592.
She concludes from her examination of these cases
that when a testator's will appears to fly in the face of the reciprocity norm,
courts commonly honor that norm by invalidating the will, often by finding
that the testator-beneficiary relationship was "confidential" and created a
presumption of undue influence .... Conversely, when the court wishes to
uphold the will, the court will view an intimate interdependent relationship
between a testator and a will beneficiary as justifying the bequest, rather
than giving rise to a presumption of invalidity.
[Vol. 81, 20021
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in the case of a close relative who had failed to meet the testa-
tor's physical or emotional needs, the fact-finder will not find the
testator guilty of a breach of any implied promise in disinheriting
the relative in favor of a non-family member. In such a case, the
fact-finder will uphold the will against the disappointed family
member's challenge.85
For the most part, however, American intestacy law does not
recognize the value of reciprocity. As Professor Frances Foster
has written, "[t]he U.S. inheritance system at best regards virtue
as its own reward. Under inflexible status-based intestacy rules,
contributions to the decedent's welfare are irrelevant for inheri-
tance purposes.""
Most American states, however, do recognize a principle of re-
verse reciprocity by which the intestacy scheme penalizes some
persons who acted in a reprehensible manner toward the intes-
tate such that the bad actor is deemed an "unworthy heir."8 " The
most significant manifestation of this principle is the "slayer stat-
ute" which generally bars one who intentionally kills the intes-
tate from taking her intestate property.88 Indeed, such statutes
Id. Professor Leslie found that courts, including courts in jurisdictions that have
adopted the substantial compliance or harmless error approaches to wills formali-
ties, enforce compliance with the reciprocity norm also by holding wills that do not
comport with the norm to have been defectively executed while excusing similar
defects in wills that comport with the reciprocity norm. Id. at 604-08.
85 Id. at 559, 587.
86 Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1239. One can cite
as counterexamples statutes that reward the decedent's caregivers, although reci-
procity may not be the acknowledged value grounding the statute. For example,
Illinois law allows for a court to direct the guardian of an estate of a mentally or
physically disabled person to make a "conditional gift" to a spouse, parent or sibling
of the disabled person who has lived with and cared for the disabled person for at
least three years. 755 ILL. COMP. STA-. 5/lla-18.1(a) and (b) (West 1992). The gift
may not be distributed until the death of the disabled person. Id. § lla-18.1(b). The
theory of the statute is that the disabled person would intend to make such a gift.
Id. § lla-18.1(a). Illinois also allows a disabled person's caregiver to assert a statu-
tory claim against the estate of the disabled person if the caregiver was the dece-
dent's spouse, parent, sibling or child. Id. § 18-1.1. The amount of the allowed
claim will depend upon the nature and extent of the disabled person's disability. Id.
§ 18-1.1.
87 But see Monopoli, supra note 12, at 273 ("The idea that wrongdoing of an heir
should affect whether he takes his share is not common to American inheritance
law.").
88 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.8, statu-
tory note (1992) (listing statutes). See also Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and
Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401, 421 (1995) (arguing
that expansion of slayer statutes so that one who abused the decedent during the
decedent's life would forfeit her rights in the decedent's estate would further the
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generally apply not only to intestate property but also to prop-
erty passing by will, revocable inter vivos trusts, life insurance
policies, and joint tenancies. 89 Section 2-803 of the 1990 Uniform
Probate Code, for example, provides that one who intentionally
and feloniously kills the decedent forfeits any right to succeed to
property passing by intestacy, will, or by a will substitute, such as
a payable-on-death account or a joint tenancy.90 The comment
to section 2-803 explains that this slayer statute is meant to im-
plement a principle of reverse reciprocity-the principle that "a
wrongdoer may not profit by his or her own wrong." 91
Moreover, in a large number of American states, the law of
intestacy recognizes this principle of reverse reciprocity with re-
spect to behavior less severe than intentional homicide. In such
states, unworthy heirs might include those who abandoned the
intestate or who had a duty to support the intestate but failed to
do so.92 In these states, the intestacy scheme bars such persons
decedent's likely donative intent and would "serve as a powerful example of soci-
ety's collective resolve to condemn family violence").
89 Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 489, 505-06 (1986) [hereinafter Fellows, Slayer].
90 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(19) (amended 1997) (definition of "governing
instrument"); id. § 2-803(a)-(c).
91 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803, cmt. (amended 1997). See also Jeffrey G. Sher-
man, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 803, 805-06 (1993)
("The rule ... is often said to be a self-evident corollary of the venerable legal
principle nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria: no one may profit
by his own wrongdoing."); Fellows, Slayer, supra note 89, at 490 ("Relying on the
equitable maxim that individuals should not profit from their own wrongful acts,
courts and legislatures bar slayers from taking their victims' property or in any way
benefitting economically from the premature death of their victims."). But see id. at
490 (arguing that the slayer rule is "an essential element of the property transfer law
system and does not rest solely on equity principles"). Slayer statutes can be seen
also as promoting the likely donative intent of the decedent. It seems reasonable to
impute to the slain decedent an intent to disinherit her slayer. Adam J. Hirsch,
Inheritance, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L.
REV. 527, 540 (2000). See also Sherman, supra, at 858-74 (arguing that the slayer
rule should not be applied in cases of mercy killing or assisted suicide because "the
decedent would presumably be grateful to the heir or legatee for his actions").
92 See generally Monopoli, supra note 12 (discussing inheritance law's treatment
of parents who abandon or fail to support their child with respect to inheritance
from the child); id. at 274 (discussing the law of a few states that bars intestate
inheritance by a surviving spouse who had abandoned the decedent spouse); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 1997) (providing that "[i]nheritance from or
through a child by either natural parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless
that natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has not refused
to support the child"); WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, supra note 35,
at 82 (noting that "courts may interpret physical and emotional abuse as construc-
tive abandonment"). See also Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheri-
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from taking an intestate share.93
Professor Foster has reported on the Chinese inheritance sys-
tem and how it incorporates the value of reciprocity to a much
greater extent than does the American system. Chinese law
makes relevant a wide range of behaviors by the potential heir
toward the decedent. 94 A Chinese court, like some American
courts, might punish an unworthy heir for abandoning, mistreat-
ing, or failing to support the decedent. 95 Unlike American
courts, however, a Chinese court might also explicitly reward one
who had cared for the decedent's needs by awarding such a per-
son a larger share of the intestate estate than she might otherwise
have gotten.96 Indeed, the court might so reward a person who is
not legally related to the decedent and who otherwise would not
have taken any of the decedent's intestate estate.97
Chinese courts enjoy great flexibility with respect to the extent
to which they may decrease the share of an unworthy heir or
increase the share of one whose behavior toward the decedent
merits reward. 98 The court might order total forfeiture of the
tance Rights: California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse But
Fails to Build an Effective Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537 (2001) (discussing sec-
tion 259 of the California Probate Code which bars an abuser from taking from the
decedent's estate property that was awarded to the decedent's estate as a result of
liability arising from the abuse).
93 Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chi-
nese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 80 (1998) [hereinafter Foster, Behavior-
Based Model]. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(5) (providing that a parent who has abandoned a child
should be barred from inheriting'from or through the child); id., at statutory notes 2,
14 (citing to statutes of twenty-three states that bar a parent, or in some statutes only
a father, who has abandoned or refused to support his child from inheriting from the
child); id. at Reporter's Note 9 (citing cases that have implemented this principle).
See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (amended 1997) (barring inheritance from
or through a child by a natural parent or her kindred if the natural parent has failed
to openly treat the child as hers or has refused to support the child); Rhodes, supra
note 58, at 524-28, 532-36 (reviewing statutes that provide for forfeiture of an aban-
doning parent's share in her child's intestate estate and arguing for a functional in-
terpretation of "parent" in other intestacy statutes that would exclude from taking a
legal parent who had abandoned her minor child); Eleanor Mixon, Note, Deadbeat
Dads: Undeserving of the Right to Inherit from their Illegitimate Children and Unde-
serving of Equal Protection, 34 GA. L. REV. 1773 (2000).
94 Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93, at 81-86.
95 Id.
96 Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1239-41.
97 Id. at 1242 ("Chinese courts routinely provide caregivers, regardless of blood or
marital relationship to the decedent, preferential treatment in intestate
succession.").
98 See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93, at 94-95 ("China's behavior-
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person's share of the estate or merely a partial reduction to the
extent that the court judges appropriate. 99 In contrast, those
American courts that are authorized to punish unworthy heirs
may do so only by ordering a total forfeiture. American courts
do not have the authority to reduce an heir's share only in part as
the court thinks is proportional to the severity of the heir's
wrong-doing.100
C. Reliance
A third goal of my proposed intestacy scheme reform is to pro-
tect the financial well-being of the committed partner who has
arranged her life so that she has become dependent on the intes-
tate for the maintenance of her standard of living.10' The reli-
ance I seek to protect contains an element of sacrifice. I seek to
protect the expectations of the surviving partner who has fore-
gone opportunities or reallocated her resources in order to main-
tain the partnership. or promote the common good of both
partners. 102
My intestacy scheme's protection of this reliance interest rec-
ognizes that non-marital relationships are stronger when the
partners take responsibility for one another, and when the part-
ners are comfortable pooling their financial and human resources
within the relationship should they find it beneficial to do so. 10 3
based model of inheritance gives courts an arsenal of remedies for penalizing mis-
conduct by heirs.").
99 Id. at 84, 94-95.
100 Id. at 84.
101 See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 497, 559 (1977) ("the provisions for passage of intestate property should be
broadened to include as possible takers those dependent upon the decedent at the
time of his death under circumstances which would lead to the expectation of contin-
ued support"); Gary, Adapting Intestacy Law, supra note 4, at 9 (citing as a fre-
quently identified and "paramount" goal of intestacy schemes goals that "derive
from a concern with support, both economic and otherwise, of the decedent's fam-
ily."). Id. at 11 ("a goal of providing support for a decedent's dependents is inextri-
cably intertwined with [intestacy] provisions for the family"); Fellows et al.,
Committed Partners, supra note 14, at'12 (commenting that the societal acceptance
that a surviving spouse should be entitled to a large portion of the decedent spouse's
intestate estate derives in part from "equity considerations of financial dependence
[and] reliance"); id. at 8 (noting the relationship between intestacy statutes and soci-
etal concerns with "equity, meaning concerns about fairness and protection of reli-
ance interests").
102 This notion of reliance is not completely separable from the reciprocity value.
It may be that a significant contribution to the couple's aggregation of wealth was
the assumption of opportunity costs in foregone career opportunities.
103 See ElIman, Divorce Rates, supra note 1, at 40-41 ("Unmarried cohabitants
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Where one partner has sacrificed opportunities for the good of
the partnership, therefore, the intestacy scheme will acknowledge
her sacrifice. This is so regardless of whether the decedent made
any explicit promise to compensate the other partner for her sac-
rifice. Moreover, from a scarce resources perspective, it makes
sense that the intestate partner's estate rather than the govern-
ment's purse satisfy the survivor's reliance interest as it was the
decedent partner who benefitted most directly from the surviving
partner's sacrifice.
Protection of this type of reliance interest does not seem to be
a central concern of succession law. The nearest examples of
such concern arguably are found in the putative spouse doctrine
and the equitable adoption doctrine. Even these doctrines, how-
ever, do not very nearly implement the principle of protection of
reliance interests that I seek to incorporate into intestacy reform.
The putative spouse doctrine 1°4 allows a court to treat a survi-
vor who was not legally married to a decedent as the decedent's
legal spouse for purposes of the intestacy statute.'0 5 The survivor
must have cohabited with the decedent in the good-faith belief
that she was the decedent's legal spouse.10 6 In this sense, the
doctrine is concerned with reliance. The doctrine concerns itself
with dependence also in that, when there is more than one puta-
tive spouse asserting a claim to the decedent's estate or where
both a putative spouse and a legal spouse are asserting such
claims, the court must equitably apportion the estate taking into
account, among other factors, the comparative needs of the
claimants.1 0 7
are less likely than married couples to pool their financial resources, to have a sense
of responsibility for one another, [and] to have the confidence in their relationship
that allows for them to specialize within it.").
104 For an in-depth discussion of the putative spouse doctrine, see generally Chris-
topher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
105 Id. at 48.
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 2.2, cmt. e. See also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AC (1983) § 209; Blakesley,
supra note 104, at 18-19 ("Good faith is the central element of the putative marriage
doctrine and its common-law counterparts", and "consists of being 'ignorant of the
cause which prevents the formation of the marriage or the defects in its celebration
which caused its nullity.'") (citation omitted).
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 2.2, cmt. e. A second factor that the court might consider in equitably apportion-
ing the estate is the duration of a claimant's cohabitation with the decedent. Id. See
also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 209 (1983) (providing that "the
court shall apportion property, maintenance, and support rights among the claim-
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Pursuant to the equitable adoption doctrine, a court may allow
a surviving foster child of the decedent to inherit from the dece-
dent's intestate estate. 118 Most courts require that the foster par-
ent have entered into an adoption contract with the person or
persons legally able to consent to the adoption and that the fos-
ter parent have failed to perform the contract even though she
raised the foster child as her own. 0 9 Some courts that have ap-
plied the equitable adoption doctrine have justified its applica-
tion on the grounds that the foster child detrimentally relied on
the foster parent's promise to adopt, which detrimental reliance
justifies the court's providing an equitable remedy for the
child.' For example, the Georgia Supreme Court, when it first
recognized the doctrine of equitable adoption in Georgia in 1913,
emphasized the reliance interests of the foster child:
Where one takes an infant into his home upon a promise to
adopt such as his own child, and the child performs all the
duties growing out of the substituted relationship of parent
and child, rendering years of service, companionship, and obe-
dience to the foster parent, upon the faith that such foster par-
ent stands in loco parentis, and that upon his death the child
will sustain the legal relationship to his estate of a natural
child, there is equitable reason that the child may appeal to a
court of equity to consummate, so far as it may be possible,
the foster parent's omission of duty in the matter of formal
adoption.1'r
ants [including a legal spouse and one or more putative spouses] as appropriate in
the circumstances and in the interests of justice").
108 See generally Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association:
Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 766-806 (1984) (presenting
a thorough examination of the theoretical bases and application of the equitable
adoption doctrine).
109 WILLIAM M. McGOVERN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND Es-
TATES 98-99 (2d ed. 2001). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5, cmt. k.
110 Hirsch, supra note 91, at 548 and n.75 (citing cases). Professor Adam Hirsch
has concluded from his reading of the equitable adoption cases, however, that it is
reasonable to infer that a court will apply the equitable adoption doctrine only when
its doing so will effectuate the foster parent's likely donative intent. Id. at 548-49
n.76.
I1 Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 660, [78 S.E. 30, 33 (quote incomplete)]
(1913). See also O'Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ga. 1994) (Sears-Collins,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the child's reliance interests in equitable adoption cases
and proposing that the court in equitable adoption cases not concern itself with the
"fiction of whether there has been a contract to adopt" but rather focus on "the
relationship between the adopting parents and the child and in particular whether
the adopting parents have led the child to believe that he or she is a legally adopted
member of their family").
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0
Protection of dependence without express regard to reliance or
sacrifice is more easily found in succession law than is the protec-
tion of reliance interests on which I wish for my intestacy reform
to focus. 112 Again, foreign models provide an illustration of how
American succession law might offer greater protection for those
who depended financially upon the decedent.113 Family mainte-
nance schemes, such as those in the United Kingdom, New Zea-
land, Australia, and Canada, allow a court to disregard a
decedent's estate plan and distribute part of the decedent's estate
to an applicant, often limited to a spouse or child, who was de-
pendent upon the decedent at her death. 14
For example, the United Kingdom's Inheritance Act of 19751"5
allows a court to make an award from the decedent's testate or
intestate estate in favor of an applicant when the court deter-
mines that the decedent's will or the intestacy scheme, or the
combination of the two, "is not such as to make reasonable finan-
cial provision for the applicant."'1 6 Under the statute, the dece-
dent's surviving spouse or child, the decedent's former spouse
who has not remarried, any person who the decedent treated as a
child of the family in relation to a marriage of the decedent, and
"any person ...who immediately before the death of the de-
ceased was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the de-
ceased" may apply for provision.' 17 In the case of an application
112 But see Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 533 (noting that intestacy law generally
fails to distinguish between heirs of "unequal capacity" so as to provide extra protec-
tion to the decedent's dependents who are infirm or disabled).
113 See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against
Disinheritance?, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405 (1997) (arguing for adoption in
the United States of a family maintenance scheme to protect children along the lines
of the scheme utilized in British Columbia).
114 See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1211; Gary,
Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 11 ("This goal of providing for dependents
is a driving concern behind the system of testator's family maintenance in force in
Australia, Canada, England and.New Zealand."). See also W.D. MACDONALD,
FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960) (arguing for replacement of the elective
share with a "decedent's family maintenance" scheme which would authorize a court
to order an award from the decedent's estate to meet the reasonable support needs
of the decedent's family members). The family maintenance systems apply to tes-
tate as well as intestate estates and allow a court to some extent to rewrite a dece-
dent's will. In this respect, such systems go well beyond the reform of intestacy law
that I advocate in this Article.
115 (United Kingdom) Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act
1975, c.63 (Eng.) (as amended by the Family Law Act 1996).
116 Id. § 2(1).
117 Id. § 1(1)(e). The statute provides that a person was being maintained by the
decedent when the decedent "otherwise than for full valuable consideration, was
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by a surviving spouse, the court is to decide the question of "rea-
sonable financial provision ... whether or not that provision is
required for his or her maintenance." 1 8 Otherwise, the court is
to interpret "reasonable financial provision" to mean an amount
that "would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for
the applicant to receive for his maintenance."' 1 9 The act does
not expressly mention reliance or sacrifice as factors that the
court should consider in determining whether to make an award
to an applicant. The act does list among factors that the court
should consider, however, the decedent's obligations and respon-
sibilities toward the applicant, other applicants, and the benefi-
ciaries of the decedent's estate; the competing financial needs
and resources of the applicant, other applicants, and the benefi-
ciaries of the decedent's estate; the physical or mental disabilities
of the applicant, other applicants, and the beneficiaries of the de-
cedent's estate; and the conduct of the applicant or any other
person. 20
China's inheritance law makes a priority the protection of the
financial interests of the decedent's dependents.12 1 The Chinese
system promotes this goal through use of forced heirship and eq-
uitable redistribution. 22 Chinese courts have discretion to dis-
tribute an intestate's estate among her dependents as the court
thinks best will meet the particular needs of those dependents.123
For example, Chinese courts might provide a disproportionate
share of the intestate's estate to a child of the intestate with a
disability that affects her ability to earn a living, 24 and might
provide a share of the estate to a person otherwise lacking a legal
family relationship with the intestate but for whom the intestate
had provided financial support. 25
making a substantial contribution in money or money's worth towards the reasona-
ble needs of that person." Id. § 1(3).
118 Id. § 1(2)(a).
''9 Id. § l(2)(b).
120 Id. § 3(1).
121 Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1217 ("China recog-
nizes 'dependence as the gravamen of inheritance.' Support, not entitlement, is the
principal basis of Chinese inheritance law.").
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1224, 1232,
124 1d. at 1231.
125 Id. at 1237-38 ("In practice, Chinese courts have found support relationships
in a variety of contexts to include rearing and education of children, long-term co-
habitation with the decedent, physical and emotional care, and even purely financial
assistance."). Chinese courts will award not only intestate property to ensure sup-
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American succession law provides limited protection for a de-
cedent's dependents in the form of a family allowance, 26 an ex-
empt property allowance,127 and a homestead allowance. 28 The
Uniform Probate Code also provides a surviving spouse with a
"supplemental elective-share amount" intended to ensure at least
a minimum level of support for a surviving spouse with actual
need who has been disinherited by the decedent spouse. 129 This
provision of the Uniform Probate Code's elective share scheme is
grounded on the notion "that the spouses' mutual duties of sup-
port during their joint lifetimes should be continued in some
form after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the dece-
dent's estate.' ' 3
0
None of these doctrines has at its heart, however, a concern
with dependence or reliance relating to sacrifice of opportunities
or allocation of resources. This type of reliance interest, which I
seek to protect in my intestacy reform, is more nearly found in
recent proposed family law reform. The American Law Insti-
tute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ground the
recharacterization of certain separate property as marital prop-
erty on just this type of reliance. I discuss this proposed family
law reform and its justification below in my justification of the
accrual approach to calculation of an intestate share.13 '
port of those dependent on the intestate during her life, but also will award property
that would have passed otherwise pursuant to the decedent's will to ensure protec-
tion of dependents. Id. at 1249. In contrast, where dependency is not an issue, Chi-
nese courts are reluctant to disregard the decedent's will to reward acts of care
toward the decedent by a claimant. Id.
126 A family allowance generally provides for a reasonable but limited amount of
maintenance to be paid to a decedent's surviving spouse or dependent children dur-
ing the administration of the decedent's estate, but often not to exceed a maximum
period of time. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (amended 1997).
127 An exempt property allowance protects certain property-commonly house-
hold furniture, furnishings, automobiles, and appliances-up to a specified maxi-
mum total value from the claims of creditors. See, e.g., id. § 2-403.
128 A homestead allowance typically gives to a decedent's surviving spouse and
minor children the right to occupy the decedent's home for a specified period of
time, often of lengthy duration. Many homestead statutes are of limited utility in
that they set a low monetary ceiling for protection of property. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) PROP: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1, cmt. j (1999).
129 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(b) (amended 1997).
130 UNIF. PROBATE CODE Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general
cmt. (amended 1997).
131 See infra notes 147-74 and accompanying text.
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D. Certainty and Ease of Administration
One can envision various schemes for the distribution of intes-
tate property that focus on honoring the donative intent of the
decedent while also seeking to reward those individuals who had
most significantly contributed to the intestate's financial, physi-
cal, or psychological well-being; and while also attempting to
protect the reliance interests of those persons who had reordered
their lives so as to have become dependent upon the decedent
for their financial comfort. Under one such system, with respect
to each person who dies intestate, a probate judge would engage
in an open-ended inquiry into the particular circumstances of the
intestate's life.132 The court would hear testimony and find facts
relating to the intestate's probable donative intent-that is, relat-
ing to the issue of which persons this intestate most likely would
have wanted to inherit her intestate estate. 133 Also, the court
would seek to determine whether any individuals were particu-
larly instrumental in contributing to the intestate's well-being-
whether it be the accumulation of her wealth or the maintenance
of her health and happiness. Finally, the court would inquire into
whether any persons had sacrificed opportunities or reallocated
their resources in reliance upon their relationship with the dece-
dent and, as a result thereof, become dependent upon the intes-
tate for their financial support. At the conclusion of its
investigation into these matters, the court would then order dis-
tribution of the decedent's intestate property to such persons and
in such portions as the court had concluded would best balance
the three values grounding the intestacy statute.
Such a scheme has a critical short-coming. Administration of
an intestate estate under an open-ended inquiry intestacy scheme
would produce great uncertainty, would be more time-consum-
132 See Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 557 (proposing that to better carry out the
goal of protecting the decedent's family one might "devise a system through which
investigation into each case determines the kind and amount of protection that each
family needs"). Gaubatz argues that:
Such an investigation would permit the law to deal with the exigencies of
the particular situation; it would avoid the existing practice of arbitrarily
setting family members' interests and levels of protection; and it would
avoid the risk that the individual family will not fit within the arbitrary
prototype adopted by the legislature.
Id.
133 See id. at 559-60 (proposing that a court be given discretion to adjust intestate
shares to "provide for the reasonable expectations or probable desires of the
decedent").
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ing, and would be greatly more expensive than is administration
under extant American intestacy schemes. 34 Certainty and ease
of administration are prized features of these extant intestacy
schemes. 135 More generally, certainty and ease of administration
are principal concerns of American succession law.
136
134 See Monopoli, supra note 12, at 261 (noting that increased litigation would be
one cost of barring intestate taking by fathers who failed to support the decedent
child); Jaki K. Samuelson & Dennis Thorson, Comment (Contemporary Studies Pro-
ject), A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of
the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1122 (1978) ("The
major objection to an implementation of a flexible intestate succession option is the
expected increase in costs, including administration time, additional court personnel,
and lawyers fees.").
135 Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 971, 1016
(1999) ("Intestate statutes preserve judicial economy by setting forth a predefined
hierarchy of persons who qualify for distribution. Disregarding the hierarchy to in-
quire into a decedent's own definition of family in the absence of a will would result
in'lengthier proceedings."). See also Monopoli, supra note 12, at 292-96 (noting the
increase in uncertainty and expense that would arise if probate courts are given dis-
cretion to deny a parent an intestate share of his child's estate because of the par-
ent's abandonment or non-support of the child and proposing that such costs could
be minimized by requiring the probate judge to give deference to a family court's
ruling during the child's life that the parent had abandoned or failed to support the
child).
136 See, e.g., Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 515 ("Simplicity in the administration of
estates is an important goal both to society and to its members."); Waggoner,
Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society, supra note 2, at 726-28 (explaining
that the drafters of the t990 Uniform Probate Code rejected equitable distribution
as the basis of the Code's revised elective share, in part, because of the uncertainty
and difficulty in administration that such an approach would introduce into the
forced share process); Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road of Probate Reform:
Finding the Way to Your Will (A Response to Professor Ascher), 77 MINN. L. REV.
659, 660 (1993) (noting that the reduction of litigation and the facilitation of estate
planning are primary goals of probate reform).
Arguably, a prime example of the infrequent subordination of certainty in succes-
sion law in favor of a second value is the "harmless error" principle with respect to
the execution of a will. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997). This
principle provides that a court may give a document effect as a will even though the
document is not executed in compliance with the jurisdiction's requirements for the
execution of a will, provided that the proponent establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent intended for the document to be her will. Id. The prin-
ciple grants this discretion to the court in order to avoid "intent-defeating outcomes
in cases of harmless error." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 1997).
Professor Foster has commented with respect to the harmless error principle that
"[i]nterestingly, many of the very scholars who insist on fixed rules in the support
context favor discretionary schemes in the case of will execution defects." Foster,
Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1204 n.25. But see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3, Reporter's
Note 2 (setting out an argument that "[t]he harmless error rule does not increase
litigation"); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Fam-
ily Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1193-94 (1986). Glendon recon-
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Indeed, while Professor Foster lauds the Chinese system for its
flexibility and its ability to pay attention to the merits of the indi-
vidual claims of the decedent's friends and family, she acknowl-
edges that such a system might be unworkable in the United
States and might even fail in China as that nation develops.
If current trends [in China] continue, increased social mobility,
accumulation of private property, and a rise in the popular use of
courts will bring about an increase in the number and complexity
of inheritance disputes. In its present form, the behavior-based
model appears fundamentally unsuited to this new environment.
It is highly time- and labor-intensive, requiring courts to evaluate
on a case-by-case basis the conduct of all potential claimants and
the most appropriate division of each estate. The flexibility that
is the hallmark of the behavior-based model today may prove to
be its greatest drawback in the future. 137
Therefore, any proposal to reform intestacy law to provide for
a decedent's surviving non-marital committed partner that
utilizes a multi-factor approach to the qualification of that part-
ner must overcome opposition from those who are concerned
about reform undermining certainty and ease of administration
in probate. 138 It is a principal challenge for succession law in this
ciles her opposition to a discretionary family maintenance scheme and her support
for a wills' formalities harmless error principle:
Discretion of the type advocated by [proponents of the harmless error prin-
ciple] is at the margins of a fixed rule and is designed to soften the rule's
effects in individual cases where its application could not serve either the
purposes of the testator or the overall purposes of inheritance law. A ma-
jor reason for disquiet about family provision legislation-that it is likely to
breed litigation-does not appear to be present in the case of grants of dis-
cretion to dispense with Wills Act compliance.
Id.
137 Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93, at 84-85. See also id. at 126
(pointing out that China's behavior-based inheritance model developed in an envi-
ronment quite different from the environment in the United States, and questioning
whether such a model could succeed in the United States). Another criticism that
might be made of any system which gives a court open-ended discretion to rewrite a
decedent's estate plan is that such a system carries a greater risk to the testamentary
freedom of those living in non-dominant family structures in that the court is more
likely to devalue their family relationships.
138 See generally Glendon, supra note 136, at 1186 (expressing uneasiness about
succession law reform that would give discretion to a judge to rearrange the dece-
dent's estate plan "according to a judge's own notion of what is reasonable"). See
also Rhodes, supra note 58, at 528 (anticipating the objection based on certainty to
her proposed reform of intestacy law to exclude inheritance by parents who aban-
don their minor child and arguing that a concern for certainty should not preclude
reform given that (1) her reform would apply only to egregious cases and (2) her
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era of the emergence of the legal movement to recognize func-
tional family139 to balance a concern with certainty and ease of
administration with the desire for succession law to better serve
the needs of property owners who have formed less dominant
family structures. 4 ' This balancing must resist the temptation to
reform would place the burden of demonstrating abandonment by clear and con-
vincing evidence on those asserting abandonment); Hernandez, supra note 135, at
1016 ("The resistance to incorporating an expanded definition of family into probate
codes may stem from a concern with not wanting to overwhelm the probate system
with open-ended inquiries into who can be considered family."). Professor Her-
nandez has argued that recognizing functional families in the context of burial in-
structions might be a good first reform that would give courts experience in the
exercise of adjudicating who is family with relatively little cost. Id. at 1018 ("The
context of challenges over burial instructions should be a manageable context in
which to respect a testator's own definition of family because it can be divorced
from probate court concerns over a testator recognizing his or her financial support
obligations to minor children and spouses.").
In crafting his Working Draft, Professor Waggoner set out to draft a multi-factor
intestacy statute that would be flexible enough to recognize deserving partners while
not excessively undermining certainty. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra
note 18, at 78 (stating that the author's goal is to devise an approach that will "mini-
mize case-by-case adjudication by opening up more efficient, bright-line tests into
which most plaintiffs with just claims could fit rather automatically").
139 Professor Tanya Hernandez has described the emergence of the legal move-
ment to recognize functional family:
Social custom is developing a concept of family as those "people who love
each other and want to work to support each other" because they simply
choose to, or because the need for a caretaker of the elderly, ill, disabled
and other dependents has prompted the formation of a family. In re-
sponse, the legal system has begun to employ a "functional approach" to
defining family. The functional approach legitimizes non-nuclear relation-
ships that share the essential qualities of traditional relationships for a
given context by inquiring whether a relationship shares the main charac-
teristics of caring, commitment, economic cooperation and participation in
domestic responsibilities. The paradigm of the functional family seeks to
give individuals greater control over the structure of their family lives to
recognize that biology is not family.
Hernandez, supra note 135, at 1006-07. See also Note, Looking for a Family Resem-
blance, supra note 16, at 1646 ("Instead of focusing on the identities and formal
attributes of the individuals within a relationship, the functional approach inquires
whether a relationship shares the essential characteristics of a traditionally accepted
relationship and fulfills the same human needs.").
140 See Glendon, supra note 136, at 1166 ("In most cases, what is required is not
actually a choice [between establishing a fixed rule and delegating discretion to a
judge], but rather a search for the proper mix of discretion and fixed rules under
each set of circumstances-the optimum degree of fine-tuning without losing coher-
ence and predictability, of reasonable certainty without losing flexibility."). See also
Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 556 (criticizing succession law for "postulat[ing] a myth-
ical 'normal' family situation and tailor[ing] the law to fit this norm," which practice,
in "many common fact patterns where the decedent and his family do not fit the
normal family model" results in "law [that] is at best inadequate and at worst un-
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focus solely on the potential for succession law reform to under-
mine certainty and ease of administration. 141 Rather, this balanc-
ing also must give weight to the benefits of discretion in
succession law that may be sacrificed to certainty.14 2  Chief
among these benefits is the ability of a discretionary system to
recognize the importance of functional families in ways that a
fixed-rule system cannot. 43
just"); Hernandez, supra note 135, at 981, 1004 (calling for courts and the law of
wills to recognize the expanding definition of family).
141 See Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 534-35 (questioning "whether ease of adminis-
tration and reduction of conflict provide sufficient justification" for intestacy statutes
that fail to foster strong social units, fail to protect functional family members and
undermine respect for the law).
142 Repeatedly, advocates of discretion in succession law have urged scholars to
focus on the costs that accompany certainty. See generally Gaubatz, supra note 101
(calling for greater flexibility in the administration of decedents' estates to better
recognize and serve social bonds, merit and need). See also, e.g., Hernandez, supra
note 135, at 1016-17.
[T]he doctrinal concern with ensuring predictability and judicial economy
in the probate of estates is one which is being valued at the expense of
undermining the stability of a testator's family of choice in contravention of
the role of inheritance to make succession more meaningful, valuable and
responsive to the needs and circumstances of a particular family.
Id. (internal quotes omitted); Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note
65, at 1204-05 (urging succession law scholars who evaluate fixed rules v. discretion-
ary inheritance systems "to consider the impact of fixed rules on people"); Gary,
Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 57 (recognizing that the desire for cer-
tainty in succession law makes it difficult to reform intestacy statutes to take into
account functional families, and arguing that "[t]he difficulty of creating a scheme of
intestate distribution in the face of the multitude of family combinations cannot be
underestimated, yet neither can the need to change an intestate system that increas-
ingly fails to make sense in view of the ways families live"); id. at 71 ("Any determi-
nation of whether a decedent had a parent-child relationship with a survivor will
require some degree of discretion [and] likely will lead to increased litigation ... but
given the state of today's families, some degree of discretion is necessary."); New-
man, supra note 69, at 549-50 (conceding that adoption of a deferred-community-
property approach to the elective share would undermine the succession law goals of
predictability and ease of administration but urging such adoption in order to better
implement the marital partnership theory); Mahoney, supra note 4, at 938 (arguing
that the "limited amount of uncertainty generated by" her proposed reform that
would bring step-children within the intestacy scheme where decedent stood in loco
parentis with respect to the step-child "would be a fair price to pay for the just
recognition of stepfamily rights"); Chester, supra note 113, at 416, 425 (stating that
"justice is more important than certainty" in discussing British Columbia's Wills Va-
riation Act, which allows a court to order an "adequate, just and equitable" provi-
sion from the decedent's estate for a spouse or child of the decedent).
143 See generally Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4. Professor Gary
has proposed a model intestacy statute which incorporates a functional approach to
defining the parent-child relationship alongside the existing definitions of parent and
child derived from a legal relationship. She argues that such reform of the dominant
fixed-rule ("blood, marriage or adoption") approach is needed because the objective
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Extant American succession law remains largely fixated on the
nuclear family and on fixed rules that derive from and serve the
nuclear family at the expense of less dominant family struc-
tures. 144 Arguments grounded in certainty continue to block re-
forms that would recognize and better serve these less dominant
family structures. 145 One should anticipate that arguments from
certainty also will be at the forefront of opposition to discretion-
ary inheritance systems that would incorporate the values of reci-
procity and reliance.146
Certainty and ease of administration, therefore, are central
concerns of my proposed intestacy reform. I seek to promote the
donative intent of the intestate, recognize the contributions of
the surviving partner to the intestate's estate and welfare, and
protect the reliance interests of the surviving partner-all while
retaining a great degree of administrative convenience. I attempt
to balance these goals principally by means of an accrual and dis-
counting scheme that I set out below.
III
THE PORTION OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE THAT
SHOULD BE AWARDED TO A SURVIVING
COMMITTED PARTNER
Ideally, the surviving committed partner should take from the
decedent's intestate estate in proportion to the extent that the
intestate would want her to take and in proportion to her reli-
approach too often fails to carry out the intestate's intent and too often leaves the
intestate's functional and true family without support. Id. at 71-72.
144 Gaubatz, supra note 101, at 534-35 (discussing the "insufficient coverage" of
intestacy statutes that fail to recognize the "family of orientation (non-blood individ-
uals with whom there are very close relationships)").
145 See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1255-56 (decry-
ing the dominance of "[c]ertainty and administrative convenience arguments" in
favor of fixed rules focused on the nuclear family and against reforms that would
promote equitable inheritance mechanisms, and calling the human cost of such dom-
inance "tremendous"); Gary, Marital Partnership Theory, supra note 70, at 581 (not-
ing the concern that a testator's family maintenance scheme that would allow a court
to disregard the testator's will to the extent the court deems it necessary to provide
for the testator's dependents would lead to increased litigation and would introduce
greater uncertainty into the estate planning process).
146 Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 65, at 1215, 1255-56 (cit-
ing to critics of family maintenance systems who rely on certainty and administrative
convenience arguments); Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 69 (theo-
rizing that a family maintenance system such as that in England has not caught on in
the United States "perhaps because of a desire for certainty and perhaps due to the
structure of the probate court system").
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ance and reciprocity interests. A first limitation on this ideal is
the need to avoid an open-ended inquiry in each case of intestacy
in which a claimant seeks recognition as the surviving committed
partner. A second limitation on this ideal is the fact that in cer-
tain circumstances, most notably when a partnership has frac-
tured shortly before the intestate's death, the intestate's most
likely donative intent will be at odds with the survivor's reciproc-
ity and reliance interests. A scheme in which the committed
partner's entitlement to a share of her partner's intestate estate
accrues as the duration of the cohabiting partnership increases
and is discounted in relation to the duration of the period be-
tween fracture of the partnership and the death of the intestate
best implements the ideal.
A. The Accrual Approach
As a general rule, American intestacy schemes ignore the du-
ration of a marriage in calculating the portion of a decedent
spouse's intestate estate to be awarded to a surviving spouse. 147
Professor Waggoner's Working Draft similarly employs such an
all-or-nothing approach. Under the Working Draft, once a per-
son qualifies as a committed partner, the duration of the partner-
ship will not affect the size of the share that the survivor takes.
In contrast, a central feature of my proposed intestacy scheme
reform is an accrual approach to calculating the portion of the
intestate estate to which the surviving committed partner shall be
entitled. Pursuant to this accrual approach, the portion of the
decedent partner's intestate estate to which the person who qual-
ifies as a surviving committed partner shall be entitled is influ-
enced by the duration of the cohabiting partnership. All else
being equal, as the length of the cohabiting partnership increases,
the size of the intestate share to which the surviving partner shall
be entitled increases also. 148
147 Cf Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, c.63 (as
amended by the Family Law Act 1996) (Eng.) §§ 3(2) & (4) (listing among factors
that a court should consider, in determining whether the disposition of a decedent's
estate makes reasonable financial provisions for an applicant of court-ordered provi-
sion, (1) the duration of the decedent's marriage to a surviving spouse or a former
spouse who has not remarried, and (2) the length of time that the decedent assumed
financial responsibility for the maintenance of an applicant who the decedent was
maintaining at her death).
148 If the decedent and the surviving partner cohabited in a partnership for more
than one period during the decedent's life, interrupted by a period of separation, all
periods of cohabiting partnership should be added together to compute the total
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I propose to give to a surviving committed partner a portion of
the decedent partner's intestate estate according to the following
schedule:
If the decedent and the surviving
committed partner cohabited in a
partnership for a period of.
at least 3 years but less than 4 years
at least 4 years but less than 5 years
at least 5 years but less than 6 years
at least 6 years but less than 7 years
at least 7 years but less than 8 years
at least 8 years but less than 9 years
at least 9 years but less than 10 years
at least 10 years but less than 11 years
at least 11 years but less than 12 years
at least 12 years but less than 13 years
at least 13 years but less than 14 years
at least 14 years but less than 15 years
at least 15 years or more
The unreduced intestate share
percentage is:
18% of the intestate estate
24% of the intestate estate
30% of the intestate estate
36% of the intestate estate
42% of the intestate estate
48% of the intestate estate
54% of the intestate estate
60% of the intestate estate
68% of the intestate estate
76% of the intestate estate
84% of the intestate estate
92% of the intestate estate
100% of the intestate estate.
149
A jurisdiction adopting my proposed intestacy scheme recog-
nizing committed partners would need to integrate my proposal
into its extant intestacy scheme so that the persons who would
have taken the decedent's intestate estate had she died without a
surviving committed partner would take that portion of the intes-
tate estate that does not go to the surviving committed partner.
For example, where the accrual schedule provides that the sur-
viving committed partner shall be entitled to an unreduced intes-
tate share percentage of eighteen percent of the intestate estate
(because the decedent and the surviving committed partner co-
habited in a partnership for a period of at least three years but
less than four years), the decedent's remaining intestate heirs
cohabiting partnership period. Periods of separation should not be credited in com-
puting the total cohabiting partnership period. See UNIF. PROBATE COE § 2-202
cmt. (amended 1997) (stating that in computing the duration of a marriage for pur-
poses of the elective share calculation, where spouses were married to each other
more than once, all periods of marriage should be added together, but the periods of
separation should be excluded).
149 This grant of 100% of the intestate estate to the surviving committed partner
in the case of a long-term partnership is in stark contrast to the Working Draft's
award to a similarly-situated surviving committed partner. Even in the case of a
thirty- or forty-year partnership, and even where the decedent is not survived by any
descendant or parent, the Working Draft would provide to the surviving committed
partner no more than $50,000 plus one-half the balance of the intestate estate. See
infra Appendix A § (a)(1).
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would take at least the remaining eighty-two percent of the intes-
tate estate. These non-partner heirs will take a greater portion of
the intestate estate in cases in which the surviving committed
partner's unreduced intestate share percentage is reduced.
My proposal provides that the "unreduced intestate share per-
centage" set forth in the accrual schedule is to be reduced if one
or two of the following three circumstances exists at the dece-
dent's death: (1) the decedent is survived by one or more de-
scendants who are not also descendants of the surviving
committed partner, (2) the decedent is not survived by any de-
scendant but is survived by at least one parent, and (3) the part-
nership between the decedent and the surviving committed
partner fractured prior to the decedent's death and remained
fractured at the time of the decedent's death. 5 ° The amount of
the reduction varies with the circumstance and is set out in Ap-
pendix B.151 Thus, where the decedent is survived by a commit-
ted partner entitled to an unreduced intestate share percentage
of eighteen percent of the intestate estate, and in addition is sur-
vived by a child who is not also a child of the surviving commit-
ted partner, the child would be entitled to the remaining eighty-
two percent of the intestate estate plus the portion of the un-
reduced intestate share percentage that is taken away from the
surviving committed partner because the decedent was survived
also by such a child. The theory of this particular discounting
provision is that the decedent would want the surviving commit-
ted partner to take less of the intestate estate where the other
surviving heir is such a child (as opposed to where, for example,
the other surviving heir is a sibling of the decedent).
I derive the intestacy accrual schedule from the elective-share
percentage schedule found in the Uniform Probate Code's elec-
tive share provisions. In general, my proposed unreduced intes-
tate share percentage is twice the elective share percentage. 52
150 See infra Appendix B § (a)(2)-(4). My proposal's treatment of this third cir-
cumstance-the partnership between the decedent and the surviving committed
partner fractured prior to the decedent's death and remained fractured at the time
of the decedent's death-is discussed in detail infra at notes 175-91 and accompany-
ing text.
151 See infra Appendix B § (a)(2)-(4).
152 For cohabiting partnerships of less than three years in duration, my intestacy
scheme does not give any portion of the intestate estate to the surviving partner.
The Uniform Probate Code's elective share schedule does entitle the surviving
spouse from a marriage of less than three years in duration to assert a claim for a
portion of the decedent spouse's estate. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202(a) &
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This doubling of the elective share percentage is intended to
award to the surviving committed partner a percentage of the
intestate estate that approximates the percentage of the intestate
estate that is partnership property. This award of all of the intes-
tate partnership property to the surviving partner is intended to
reflect not only the portion that is a return on the survivor's con-
tribution to the partnership property titled in the decedent's
name, but also an additional portion to protect the survivor's re-
liance interests and to reflect the decedent's likely intent to pro-
vide generously for her surviving partner.
The Uniform Probate Code's elective share calculation seeks
to entitle the surviving spouse to one-half of the marital property
from the union. Thus, the elective share fraction represents the
drafter's estimate of the percentage of property that is one-half
of the marital property for a relationship of any given dura-
tion.153 To calculate the total percentage of property that is mari-
tal property, one must double the elective-share percentage.
Therefore, to award all of the intestate partnership property to
the surviving committed partner, my intestacy accrual schedule
doubles the elective-share percentage.
The Uniform Probate Code's elective share calculation seeks
to prevent a surviving spouse from asserting a claim to an elec-
tive share when the surviving spouse already owns half or more
of the marital property from the union.154 To do this, the elective
share percentage is first applied against an augmented estate,
which consists generally.of all of the property owned by either
(b) (amended 1997). For an explanation as to why my intestacy scheme excludes
surviving partners of relationships of less than three years in duration, see infra
notes 211-39 and accompanying text.
153 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), gen-
eral cmt. (amended 1997) (stating that "[b]y approximation, the redesigned system
equates the elective-share percentage of the couple's combined assets with 50% of
the couple's marital assets-assets subject to equalization under the partnership/
marital-sharing theory").
154 See id. The general comment to part 2 of the Uniform Probate Code states
that the intended effect of the elective share calculation in the case of a long-term
marriage
is to increase the entitlement of the surviving spouse when the marital as-
sets were disproportionately titled in the decedent's name; and to decrease
or even eliminate the entitlement of the surviving spouse when the marital
assets were more or less equally titled or disproportionately titled in the
surviving spouse's name.
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spouse at the decedent's death.1 5 Next, the product of this cal-
culation is reduced by the survivor's credits, which include an ap-
proximation of all marital property already owned by the
surviving spouse.
Consider a simple example: Assume a decedent who died af-
ter ten years of marriage. At her death, the decedent owned
$200,000 worth of property. The surviving spouse owned
$400,000 worth of property titled in his name. No property
passed to the surviving spouse at the decedent spouse's death by
means of intestacy, will or non-probate vehicle.
The Uniform Probate Code's elective-share percentage for a
ten-year marriage is thirty percent of the augmented estate. The
augmented estate in this simple example is valued at $600,000.
Thus, the elective share amount in this example is $180,000. This
represents an approximation of the amount of marital property
to which the survivor is entitled.
The Uniform Probate Code's elective share calculation sub-
tracts from this $180,000 an approximation of the amount of mar-
ital property that the survivor already owns. To calculate the
approximation of the amount of marital property that the survi-
vor already owns, one multiples the amount of property that the
survivor already owns-here, $400,000-times twice the elective
share percentage-here, sixty percent.' 5 6 Pursuant to this calcu-
lation, the survivor in this example is charged with owning
$240,000 of marital property, which is more marital property than
that to which he is entitled. Therefore, the final amount from the
decedent spouse's estate to which the surviving spouse in this ex-
155 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-204 (amended 1997) (including within the aug-
mented estate the value of the decedent's net probate estate); id. § 2-205 (including
within the augmented estate the value of the decedent's non-probate transfers to
others than the surviving spouse); id. § 2-206 (including within the augmented estate
the value of the decedent's non-probate transfers to the surviving spouse); id. § 2-
207 (including within the augmented estate the value of the surviving spouse's net
assets at the decedent's death and, in addition, property that would have been in-
cluded within the augmented estate under § 2-205 had the surviving spouse died at
the decedent's death rather than the decedent). See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE Part
2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general cmt. (amended 1997) (stating that
the elective share percentage is applied to the augmented estate to yield the elective
share amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled because "[i]f the elective-
share percentage were to be applied only to the decedent's assets, a surviving spouse
who has already been overcompensated in terms of the way the couple's marital
assets have been nominally titled would receive a further windfall under the elec-
tive-share system").
156 See UNIF, PROBATE CODE § 2-209(a)(2) (amended 1997).
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ample is entitled pursuant to the elective share is zero.157
My intestacy scheme calculation differs from the Uniform Pro-
bate Code's elective share calculation in that it is not concerned
with the amount of partnership property that the surviving com-
mitted partner already owns. This difference derives from the
theories underlying my intestacy scheme as contrasted with the
theory underlying the Uniform Probate Code's elective share.
The elective share operates even in the face of the decedent's
expressed and unequivocal contrary intent. An elective share
award represents the amount to which a surviving spouse is enti-
tled in the face of the decedent spouse's express disinheritance of
the surviving spouse (by will or will substitute). Therefore, the
Uniform Probate Code's elective share calculation guards against
"overcompensating" the survivor in whose name a dispropor-
tionate share of the marital property already is titled.
The accrual intestacy calculation, in contrast, operates in the
absence of such an express disinheritance (at least with respect to
the intestate property). Indeed, one of the goals of my intestacy
scheme is to promote the donative intent of the intestate. The
intestacy scheme need not be as concerned, therefore, with giving
the surviving partner a greater portion of the decedent's intestate
estate than that to which she is "entitled."
This accrual method will tend to further each of the four values
that should ground an intestacy scheme's provisions recognizing
the surviving committed partner. First, an accrual approach to
determining the surviving partner's portion of the decedent's in-
testate estate is designed to promote the imputed donative intent
of the typical intestate decedent partner. It seems likely that the
intestate decedent would want a partner of many years to take
more of her intestate property than she would want a partner of
few years to take.15 Indeed, Professor Fellows recent empirical
research into the donative preferences of those Minnesota re-
sidents living in a committed partnership provides some tentative
support for this proposition.1 59
157 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), gen-
eral cmt. (amended 1997) (explaining that when the value of the survivor's credits
exceeds the elective share amount, the survivor is not entitled to any additional
amount from the decedent's estate, unless the survivor is entitled to a "supplemental
elective share-amount" pursuant to § 2-202(b)).
158 This is not to deny that in some cases intensity of affection will diminish over
time.
159 Professor Fellows and her colleagues asked their survey's respondents to dis-
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Second, an accrual approach to the intestate inheritance rights
of a surviving committed partner recognizes the claimant's finan-
cial contributions and acts of care with respect to the decedent
partner to the extent that the duration of the cohabiting partner-
ship correlates positively with the performance of such contribu-
tions and acts of care. Such a correlation seems highly likely in
the run of cases. One could reasonably assume a direct relation-
ship between the duration of the cohgabiting partnership and the
extent to which the surviving partner contributed to the intestate
partner's well-being, including her financial well-being.
This assumption is the expressed rationale for the 1990 Uni-
form Probate Code's accrual-type elective share. The accrual-
type elective share adjusts the surviving spouse's ultimate entitle-
ment to the length of the marriage. The longer the marriage, the
larger the "elective-share percentage." The sliding scale adjusts
for the correspondingly greater contribution to the acquisition of
the couple's marital property in a marriage of fifteen years than
in a marriage of fifteen days. 160
tribute the property of a third-party where the third-party died survived by a partner
and parents ("Scenario A") and, alternatively where she died survived by a partner
and a child from a prior relationship ("Scenario C"). Fellows et al., Committed Part-
ners, supra note 14, at 59-60. The Fellows survey's findings were as follows: With
respect to Scenario A, for respondents with same-sex partners, "having been in the
relationship for at least five years was positively associated with a preference for
having the partner receive a greater share of the decedent's estate. Otherwise, the
length of time spent living together had only a weak relationship to the distributive
preferences." Id. at 61. For respondents with other-sex partners, "[b]oth having
been in the relationship for at least five years and having cohabited for at least five
years were each strongly related to a preference for having the partner receive a
greater share of the decedent's estate." Id. With respect to Scenario C, for respon-
dents with same-sex partners, "[b]oth the duration of the relationship and the time
spent cohabiting were positively associated with a preference for having the partner
inherit a greater share of the estate." Id. at 62. For respondents with other-sex
partners, "[t]he length of the relationship showed no association to the distributive
preferences of the respondents, but time spent cohabiting was positively associated
with a preference for having the partner inherit a greater share of the estate." Id.
See also ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., supra note 11, at 81 (reporting that "[t]he
Alberta lawyers we have spoken to ... indicate that where the spouses both enter
the second (or later) marriage with assets, they often leave their own assets to their
children of an earlier marriage [however,] the longer the marriage, the more that is
left to the surviving spouse").
160 UNIF. PROBATE CODE Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), general
cmt. (amended 1997). See also id. (explaining that "[i]n the short-term, later-in-life
marriage.., the effect of implementing [the accrual approach] is to decrease or even
eliminate the entitlement of the surviving spouse [to an elective share] because in
such a marriage neither spouse is likely to have contributed much, if anything, to the
acquisition of the other's wealth").
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Third, the accrual approach protects the surviving committed
partner's reliance interests in the partnership. It seems reasona-
ble as well to assume a direct relationship between the duration
of the cohabiting partnership and the extent to which the survi-
vor has forgone opportunities in order to preserve the partner-
ship or otherwise has reordered her life so as to have become
dependent financially on the intestate. As the partnership en-
dures, the partners likely will increasingly come to intermingle
their finances and their plans for the future. Moreover, they
might increasingly come to see the property of each as being
available to meet the needs of both partners. In this sense, each
partner will come to rely upon the financial support of the other
partner.
This assumption that a relationship is more likely to induce fi-
nancial reliance as the duration of the relationship increases is
the rationale underlying the American Law Institute's Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution's recharacterization of some or
all separate property as marital property, where the marriage is
of sufficient duration, for the purposes of the court's equitable
division of property between the spouses at divorce. 6' The Prin-
ciples provide generally that, at the dissolution of a marriage,
separate property of a spouse should be assigned to the spouse
who owns it. 162 However, the Principles also provide in certain
circumstances for the recharacterization of separate property as
marital property, the value of which marital property is then pre-
sumptively distributed equally between the spouses. 6 3
Section 4.12 of the Principles provides that at the dissolution of
a marriage that exceeds a minimum duration, which minimum
duration the adopting jurisdiction must specify, a portion of the
separate property that a spouse held when she entered into the
161 See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.12. This recharacterization of separate property as
marital property does not apply in the case of domestic partnerships under the Prin-
ciples. Id. § 6.04(3) (providing that "[p]roperty that would be recharacterized as
marital property under § 4.12 if the parties had been married, is not domestic-part-
nership property").
162 Id. § 4.11(1).
163 Id. § 4.12 (providing for the recharacterization of separate property as marital
property in marriages that exceed a specified minimum duration); id. § 4.11(2)
("Separate property that is recharacterized as marital property under § 4.12 is allo-
cated between the spouses under § 4.09 and not under ... section [4.11(1)]." ); id.
§ 4.09(1) (stating that generally "marital property and marital debts are divided at
dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in value, although not neces-
sarily identical in kind." ).
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marriage should be recharacterized as marital property. 164 The
percentage of separate property that is so recharacterized de-
pends upon the length of the marriage.. The longer the marriage,
the greater the percentage of separate property that is
recharacterized as marital property. 165 In a marriage of sufficient
duration, all of the separate property that a spouse brought to
the marriage is recharacterized as marital property. 166
In addition, this section of the Principles provides for the
recharacterization at divorce of a portion of separate property
acquired during the marriage where the marriage is of a specified
minimum duration and the spouse who owns the separate prop-
erty at issue has owned the property for a specified minimum
duration.' 67 The length of the marriage and the length of the
property "holding period" determine how much of the separate
property is recharacterized as marital property.'68 Where there
is a sufficiently lengthy marriage and a sufficiently lengthy hold-
ing period, the full value of the separate property acquired dur-
ing the marriage is recharacterized as marital property.169
164 Id. § 4.12(1).
165 Id. § 4.12(1)(a).
166 Id. § 4.12(1)(b). The drafters acknowledge that a "premise of this section
[4.12], that after 30 or 35 years of marriage most people will expect that property
their spouses brought into the marriage will be available to them jointly upon retire-
ment or in an emergency, remains untested." Id. § 4.12, Reporter's Notes, cmt. a.
167 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 4.12(2). In general, property acquired during the marriage by either
spouse is marital property. Id. § 4.03(1). Examples of property acquired during the
marriage that is separate property include property acquired by one spouse by gift
or inheritance and property acquired by one spouse after the spouses have entered
into a written separation agreement and have begun living separate and apart. Id.
§§ 4.03(2) & (4).
168 Id. § 4.12(2)(a).
169 Id. § 4.12(2)(b). The Principles' drafters offer the following illustration of how
an adopting jurisdiction might choose to implement these rules:
Jurisdiction A implements the principles set forth in Paragraphs (1) and (2)
with the following language: ...
(a) For each year of marriage after the fifth year, four percent of the value
of all separate property held by the spouses at the time of their marriage is
treated at dissolution as the spouses' marital property. In marriages of 30
or more years' duration, all separate property held by the spouses at the
time of the marriage is treated at dissolution as marital property.
(b) In marriages of five or more years' duration during which a spouse
acquires separate property, four percent of the value of that separate prop-
erty is treated at dissolution as marital property for each "augmented year"
applicable to the property.
(1) The augmented years applicable to any item of separate property
acquired during the marriage equal
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The Principles' drafters expressly justified this recharacteriza-
tion scheme on the principle of reliance:
After many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think
of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they
would be so classified under the technical property rules.
Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that such as-
sets will be available to provide for their joint retirement, for a
medical crisis of either spouse, or for other personal emergen-
cies. The longer the marriage the more likely it is that the
spouses will have made decisions about their employment or
the use of their marital assets that are premised in part on such
expectations about the separate property of both spouses.
170
Of course, the accrual method yields an approximation. It has
not been designed to be exactly accurate in any given case. But
that should not be a significant concern.171
The alternative would be to inquire in each case into the actual
donative intent of the decedent, the actual extent to which the
survivor contributed to the intestate's well-being, and the actual
degree of reliance by the survivor on the continuation of the
partnership and on the decedent. Such an open-ended inquiry,
(A) the number of years from the fifth year after the property's
acquisition to commencement of the dissolution action, plus
(B) half the number of years between the fifth year of marriage
and the year of the property's acquisition.
(2) This subsection does not apply to property acquired less than three
years before commencement of the dissolution action.
Id. § 4.12, cmt. b.
170 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 4.12, cmt. a. The Principles' drafters analogize their approach to that
taken by the Uniform Probate Code's elective share which gradually increases the
size of the elective share available to a surviving spouse as the duration of the mar-
riage increases.
If the marriage ends with the death of the wealthier spouse, the common
law has traditionally provided the remedy of a forced share for survivors
not otherwise provided for. The 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate
Code gradually enlarges the spouse's forced share with the duration of the
marriage according to a mechanical formula. Section 4.12 of these Princi-
ples provides an analogous remedy when the marriage ends with dissolu-
tion rather than death.
Id.
171 See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 53 (noting with re-
spect to the accrual method incorporated into the 1990 Uniform Probate Code's
elective share provision that:
The advantage of the UPC system is that it avoids the administrative diffi-
culties of post-death classification and tracing-to-source that would be en-
demic to a deferred-community elective share. The trade-off is that it does
what its name implies-it approximates. No approximation system will give
precisely accurate results in each given case.)
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of course, would be costly and administratively burdensome and
perhaps impracticable. The accrual approach allows for the em-
phasis on and promotion of the values of donative intent, reci-
procity and reliance while maintaining an ease of
administration.172
Indeed, the proposed accrual method also serves the values of
certainty and administrative convenience in at least two addi-
tional ways. First, the accrual method, which provides a rela-
tively small share of the decedent's intestate estate to the
survivor of a short-term cohabiting partnership, greatly reduces
the incentive of both the claimed surviving partner and the dece-
dent's other intestate heirs to litigate the issue of whether a com-
mitted partnership existed when the relationship at issue was, at
most, a short-term relationship. This disincentive should tend to
reduce greatly the amount of litigation over the issue.
Second, the accrual method reduces the likelihood of a court
making a relatively costly "wrong" decision as to whether a qual-
ifying committed cohabiting partnership existed. The determina-
tion as to whether a claimant was a committed partner such that
she should share in the intestate estate will be more difficult-a
closer call-in relationships of relatively short duration. In such
relationships, however, even if the claimant qualifies as a surviv-
ing committed partner, she will take only a relatively small part
of the decedent's intestate estate. Thus, the accrual method min-
imizes the consequence of a "wrong" decision.173 With respect to
relationships of greater duration, in which a greater share of the
intestate estate is at stake, the evidence that such a relationship
existed should be far more compelling and, therefore, the judg-
ment as to whether such a relationship existed should be in most
cases a much clearer call for the court (and potential litigants) to
172 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE Part 2 (Elective Share of Surviving Spouse), gen-
eral cmt. (amended 1997) (noting that "[b]ecause ease of administration and predict-
ability of result are prized features of the probate system," the 1990 Uniform
Probate Code's elective share implements the marital partnership theory by means
of an accrual approach which avoids the need to identify which of the spouses' prop-
erty was marital and which was separate).
173 Where the partners have registered their relationship, the court can be certain
that the survivor is a committed partner. The accrual method is not needed in such
instances as a means to reduce the cost of an incorrect decision as to whether the
decedent and the claimant enjoyed a committed partnership. Even in the case of
registered partners, however, the accrual schedule serves the values of reciprocity
and reliance. Perhaps the certainty distinction between registered and unregistered
partners is justification for application of an enhanced accrual schedule for the survi-
vor of a registered partnership.
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make. 74
B. The Discounting Approach After a Fracture
of the Partnership
The Working Draft requires that a couple be cohabiting at the
death of the intestate decedent in order for the surviving partner
to qualify for an intestate share. That the partners had separated
at the time of the intestate's death is an absolute bar to the survi-
vor's taking. Generally, this is the approach of extant intestacy
schemes that utilize a multi-factor approach to the identification
of a committed partner.17 5
A rationale that supports this approach is the view that separa-
tion of the couple is most commonly a manifestation of the desire
of at least one of the parties to terminate the partnership: Sepa-
ration generally signals an end to partnership status so that it is
no longer appropriate to engage in a multi-factor inquiry into
whether a partnership existed at the time of death. 176 A related
rationale is that separation commonly coincides with a desire of
the parties that the surviving partner not take a share of intestate
property at the death of the first to die.177
174 It should be acknowledged that in some cases the determination of a start date
for the cohabiting partnership period will be difficult and the exercise will result in
increased litigation as contrasted with an all-or-nothing scheme in which one who
qualifies as a surviving committed partner takes a specified share regardless of the
duration of the cohabitation. These cases, in which the decedent has arguably died
around the anniversary of the start of a cohabiting partnership period that is rela-
tively uncertain, should be relatively rare. By way of illustration, in a case in which
the start of the cohabiting partnership period is unclear but certainly was during the
period of June to September of Year zero, a precise determination is unnecessary if
the decedent died in December of Year eight. The surviving committed partner
qualifies for an intestate share derived from an unreduced intestate share percentage
of forty-eight percent (based on a cohabiting partnership period of at least eight
years but less than nine years) regardless of whether the cohabiting partnership pe-
riod began in June or September.
175 See ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., supra note 11, at 123 ("New Hampshire, the
five Australian states and the Waggoner proposal also require that the cohabitant be
living with the deceased at the time of death in order to share upon intestacy.").
176 Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 82 n.147
Under most intestacy laws, if spouses separate prior to the decedent's
death, the survivor still takes an intestate share. The reason is that mar-
riage creates a legal relationship that is terminated by divorce, not by sepa-
ration. The most public way by which de facto partners typically manifest
the creation of their relationship is by moving into the same household and
manifest its termination by moving out.
Id. (citations omitted).
177 Id. at 81-82 (speaking of decedents who had separated from their partner at
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In pondering reform of Alberta, Canada's intestate succession
act, the Alberta Law Reform Institute reasoned instructively as
follows with respect to this issue:
[I]t makes no sense to assume that the deceased cohabitant
would want his or her estate to go to the separated cohabitant
after the relationship has come to an end. Separation with in-
tent to end the relationship is for cohabitants the equivalent of
divorce for married persons. Some cohabitants will see this as
harsh and others will see it as a benefit, but it is a consequence
of cohabiting outside marriage. The definition [of a cohabi-
tant who shall qualify for a share of the decedent's intestate
estate] should require that the couple be living together at the
time of death.' 78
The Alberta reformers' decision that a qualifying cohabitant
must not have been separated from her partner at the partner's
death follows from the reformers' antecedent decision that the
central goal of the intestacy scheme should be to promote the
donative wishes of the intestate. 79
Similarly, the Working Draft's approach to separation is con-
sistent with an intestacy scheme that has as its sole or dominant
value promoting the likely intent of the decedent. Indeed, a
scheme so grounded might deny an intestate share also to a legal
spouse who was living separate and apart from the decedent
spouse at the intestate's death. One might reasonably conclude
that the intestate who was living separate and apart from her
spouse at her death would not have wanted her surviving spouse
to take a share of her intestate estate, or at least would not have
wanted him to take as great a share as had the couple been living
together as wife and husband at the intestate's death.180
the time of their deaths and commenting that "the defendants's leaving the house-
hold unmistakably manifested their intentions not to make any voluntary transfers
to the [putative partners]").
178 ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., supra note 11, at 122.
179 Id. at 61 ("Unless some compelling social policy requires deviation from how
most intestates in similar familiar circumstances would want to distribute their es-
tate, intestacy rules should reflect those wishes. We recommend that this be the goal
served by the Intestate Succession Act."). The sole additional goal adopted by the
Alberta reformers was to "create a clear and orderly scheme of distribution." Id.
180 But see id. at 96 ("We are not convinced that separation [of the spouses] alone
is sufficient reason to assume that most intestates . . . would no longer want their
assets to pass to their surviving spouse."). The Alberta reformers would deny an
intestate share to a separated surviving spouse, however, when one spouse has filed
for divorce or brought an application for division of marital property, or where the
spouses have divided their marital property with an intent to finalize their affairs.
Again, the reformers focus here on the intent of the decedent: They conclude that
[Vol. 81, 2002]
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One might suppose an intent-centric intestacy scheme that al-
lowed for the possibility that a surviving separated partner might
take an intestate share. An intent-centric scheme might concern
itself with the occasional partners who did not view their separa-
tion as necessarily permanent. More precisely, such a scheme
might consider whether the intestate held out the hope for recon-
ciliation with the separated partner. One might reasonably hy-
pothesize that partners who are separated but who contemplate
reconciliation would want the surviving partner to share in their
intestate estate. An intent-centric scheme might inquire, there-
fore, into whether the intestate believed that she and her partner
were likely to reconcile, and might award the survivor of such a
partnership an intestate share.
The Working Draft does not concern itself with the possibility
of reconciliation. This approach has the virtues of simplicity and
objectivity. Once the couple separates there is no call for a diffi-
cult and subjective inquiry into whether the intestate viewed the
separation as permanent or rather as a possibly temporary inter-
ruption of the committed partnership.
I propose to allow the survivor of a recently-fractured partner-
ship at the death of one of the partners to take an intestate share
in some cases. This proposal is not based in any large part, how-
ever, on the possibility that the partners might have reconciled.
Indeed, my proposal would allow the survivor of a recently-frac-
tured partnership to take an intestate share regardless of whether
the intestate held out hope of reconciliation. Thus, my approach
too avoids any inquiry into the intestate's state of mind with re-
spect to the likelihood of reconciliation.
I propose that where the partnership between the decedent
and the surviving committed partner fractured prior to the dece-
dent's death and remained fractured at the time of the decedent's
death, the intestate share percentage to which the survivor other-
wise would be entitled shall be discounted in proportion to the
length of time between the fracture and the intestate's death. 8'
The survivor's share shall be reduced by fifty percent if the part-
nership fractured in the year prior to the decedent's death, by
any of these three events signifies a point at which it is reasonable to assume that the
intestate would not want the surviving spouse to be a beneficiary of her estate. Id.
at 95.
181 The ending date of the partners' cohabitation would seem the most objective
means to mark the fracture of the relationship.
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seventy-five percent if the partnership fractured more than one
year prior to the decedent's death but less than two year's prior
to the decedent's death, and by one hundred percent if the part-
nership fractured more than two years prior to the decedent's
death. 182
In addition, my proposal would deny a claimant any intestate
share where the fracture of her relationship with the decedent
led to a distribution of the parties' assets pursuant to contract or
statute.183 For example, if the relevant jurisdiction had adopted
the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution with respect to the allocation of domestic partnership
property between former partners, 184 and if a court proceeding
so allocating domestic partnership property between the former
partners followed the fracture of the partnership, the surviving
former partner would not be entitled to any portion of the dece-
dent's intestate estate. This bar follows from the rationale for my
discounting approach which is discussed immediately below.
The reciprocity and reliance rationales principally ground this
discounting approach. The surviving partner of a recently-frac-
tured relationship is likely to have contributed to a significant
portion of the wealth that the intestate possessed at her death
and is far more likely to have done so as contrasted with the sur-
viving former partner of a relatively long-ago fractured relation-
ship. Moreover, the likelihood that the partners have equitably
divided up their assets is least where the fracture occurred quite
closely in time to the decedent's death. In addition, the survivor
of a recently-fractured partnership in many cases is unlikely yet
to have had the opportunity to undo her dependence on the in-
testate for her financial well-being. And, again, she is less likely
to have done so as contrasted with the surviving former partner
of a long-ago fractured partnership.
The Alberta reformers' assertion that "[s]eparation with intent
to end the relationship is for cohabitants the equivalent of di-
vorce for married persons" '185 might be generally accurate with
respect to the donative intent of the partners and spouses. With
respect to the financial consequences of the fracture, however,
divorce and partnership separation are grossly dissimilar. The
182 See infra Appendix B § (a)(4).
183 See id. § (a)(4)(iv).
184 See infra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
185 ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., supra note 11 at 122.
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equitable distribution of property and, in certain circumstances,
the availability of an award of spousal support concomitant with
divorce generally makes the inclusion of an ex-spouse within the
intestacy scheme unnecessary to satisfy the reciprocity and reli-
ance interests of the surviving ex-spouse. Absent an enforceable
contract with respect to these matters, however, the fracture of a
committed partnership generally entails no equitable distribution
or support payments. Inclusion within the intestacy scheme of
the ex-partner of a recently-fractured partnership, therefore, is
necessary to protect the ex-partner's reliance and reciprocity
interests.
I concede that, in allowing for an ex-partner to share in the
decedent's intestate estate, my goal of promoting the values of
reciprocity and reliance comes in conflict, in the run of cases,
with my goal of promoting the intestate's likely donative intent.
Such a conflict is not unknown to succession law. The elective
share also subjugates testamentary intent in favor of values simi-
lar to my reciprocity and reliance values-the marital sharing
and need/duty of support rationales.' 86
The "marital sharing theory" grounding the elective share is
reciprocity based: It asserts that both spouses necessarily con-
tributed to the wealth accumulated by either spouse during the
marriage and, therefore, both spouses are entitled to enjoy a por-
tion of that wealth regardless of how the spouses held title to
it. 87 The need/duty of support rationale grounding the elective
share asserts that the decedent spouse owed a duty of support to
her spouse during her life and that duty should continue to some
extent at her death in light of, among other reasons, the surviving
spouse's expectation that he will be supported. 18 Similarly, the
reliance interest grounding my intestacy reform proposal centers
186 See also Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 c.63
(Eng.) (as amended by the Family Law Act 1996) § 1 (allowing a decedent's former
spouse who has not remarried to apply for provision from the decedent's testate or
intestate estate on the ground that the estate plan otherwise does not "make reason-
able financial provision" for her).
187 Gary, Marital Partnership Theory, supra note 70, at 572, 577 (discussing the
marital partnership theory).
188 Id. at 577. Professor Gary also lists as reasons why the testator spouse should
provide for her surviving spouse (1) the moral duty that each spouse owes to the
other, and (2) the public policy against allowing a surviving spouse to become a
public charge when the decedent spouse's estate might be used to support the sur-
viving spouse. Id. See also id. at 605 ("An elective share statute should protect a
spouse who forgoes career opportunities to care for children.").
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on the notion that the partners' sacrifices for each other and for
the good of the relationship give rise to an expectation of contin-
ued financial support and a corollary financial obligation that to
some degree survives the death of a partner and survives the
fracture of the partnership.
In nearly all of the common law states that provide a surviving
spouse with an elective share, the circumstance that the spouses
were living separate and apart at the death of the first of them to
die does not impair the survivor's right to a forced share of the
decedent's estate.' 89 This is consistent with the two theories that
ground the modern elective share. Similarly, allowing the surviv-
ing ex-partner of a recently-fractured partnership to share in the
decedent's intestate estate promotes the reciprocity and reliance
rationales.
Moreover, with respect to the elective share, the donative in-
tent that is being subjugated is express. In contrast, my proposed
intestacy scheme reform subjugates an imputed donative intent.
The case for subjugating donative intent in favor of reliance and
reciprocity interests, therefore, arguably is even stronger with re-
spect to the intestate decedent.1 90
Finally, I acknowledge that my proposed discounting approach
would increase the amount of uncertainty associated with a
multi-factor approach. Under extant multi-factor approach stat-
utes and the Working Draft, a court must determine whether the
partners separated prior to the decedent's death. My discounting
approach requires in addition that the court determine with some
precision when any such separation occurred. One would expect
that in cases in which the separation date appears to be roughly
one year prior or two years prior to the decedent's death but is
not clearly greater than or less than respectively either one year
189 Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 34 (noting that "in most com-
mon law states a surviving spouse has the right to an elective share of the estate of
the decedent spouse, regardless of whether the spouses conducted their lives as mar-
ried persons"). But see id. (pointing out that under New Jersey law, an elective
share is unavailable to a spouse who was living apart from her spouse at his death,
citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1 (West 1999) and, similarly, under Oregon law, the
elective share "can be denied or reduced if the spouses were living apart when one
of the spouses died", citing OR. REV. STAT. § 114.135 (1999)).
190 See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 4, at 71 (pointing out that
"[d]iscretion when a person dies intestate ... present[s] different issues from the use
of discretion in testamentary estates ... [in that a] significant criticism of discretion
in connection with testate decedents-interference with testamentary freedom-
does not exist where the decedent has not exercised the testamentary freedom").
[Vol. 81, 2002]
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or two years prior to the decedent's death, the termination-date
determination will be litigated at some length.1 91
C. Cases of Partial Intestacy
An intestacy statute controls the distribution of the decedent's
probate property only to the extent that the distribution of that
property is not governed by the decedent's will. A property
owner who dies without a valid will dies wholly intestate with
respect to her probate property. 92 A property owner who dies
with a valid will that does not successfully make a complete dis-
position of her probate property dies partially intestate. 193 In
this latter case, the intestacy statute will govern the distribution
of the decedent's probate property not governed by the dece-
dent's will.
The Working Draft, however, applies only "[i]f an unmarried,
adult decedent dies without a valid will and leaves a surviving
committed partner."' 94 Thus, the Working Draft has no applica-
tion in cases of partial intestacy. Necessarily, in cases in which a
committed partner dies partially intestate, other provisions of the
intestacy scheme would govern the passing of the decedent's in-
testate property. Presumably, these provisions would pass the
committed partner's intestate property to her close blood rela-
tions or, if she has no blood relations within the prescribed de-
gree of relationship, to the state.
In support of the Working Draft's approach to partial intes-
tacy, one might argue that where the testator has executed a will
(even one that does not make a complete disposition of the testa-
tor's property) but has not seen fit to devise certain property to
her partner by that will, this is a strong indication that the dece-
191 An alternative approach that would reduce the incentive to litigate the exact
date of fracture would adopt a sliding scale that decreases on a daily basis for the
period from one to 730 days. Brad Joondeph suggested this approach to me.
192 Such a property owner might effectively pass much of her property at her
death by means of "non-probate" will substitutes such as a joint tenancy or a revoca-
ble inter vivos trust.
193 The testator's failure to include in her will a clause intended to dispose of the
residue of her estate, or the invalidity or failure of such a-residuary clause gift, might
lead to the testator's partial intestacy. A residuary gift might fail, for example,
where the gift is made to one who ultimately predeceases the testator, and where the
lapsed gift is not redirected by an anti-lapse statute and does not pass to another
residuary beneficiary. The property that is the subject of such a lapsed gift will pass
by intestacy.
194 Infra Appendix A § (a).
HeinOnline  -- 81 Or. L. Rev. 307 2002
OREGON LAW REVIEW
dent did not wish to provide that property at her death to her
partner. The argument would continue that the presence of such
a strong indication of intent would undermine our confidence in
any multi-factor inquiry into the nature of the decedent's rela-
tionship with the claimed surviving committed partner so much
so that it makes such an inquiry inappropriate. This argument
assumes that the multi-factor inquiry ultimately seeks to deter-
mine whether the decedent's relationship with the claimed sur-
viving committed partner was of such a quality that we should
infer an intent on the part of this decedent to provide for her. If
so, regardless of what our multi-factor inquiry revealed, our con-
fidence in an inferred intent to provide certain property to the
claimant would be undermined by our knowledge that the dece-
dent partner executed a will and failed to devise that property to
her. 195
If the rationale for not applying a multi-factor approach in
cases of partial intestacy relates to a concern that the decedent's
expressed testamentary intent suggests that she would not have
wanted the surviving partner to take a share of her intestate
property, then perhaps the multi-factor inquiry should be applied
in cases of partial intestacy where the decedent executed her will
prior to the onset of the committed partnership. This is so be-
cause the strength of the inference that the decedent intended to
disinherit her partner depends critically on when the committed
partner drafted her will. A pre-partnership will speaks less
clearly of the testator's intent that the surviving partner be ex-
cluded from sharing in her intestate estate. The protection af-
forded to a surviving legal spouse who married a testator after
the testator executed her will, and the rationale for such protec-
tion, provides an instructive parallel.
For example, section 2-301 of the Uniform Probate Code pro-
vides that a surviving spouse who married his spouse after the
decedent spouse executed her will is entitled to the share of the
decedent's probate estate that he would have received had the
testator died intestate.' 96 This entitlement of a spouse in the case
of a premarital will is meant to effectuate the unexpressed intent
195 A similar argument might be made in cases of partial or even total intestacy
where the decedent utilized will substitutes to pass all or substantially all of her non-
probate property to others than the surviving partner.
196 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a) (amended 1997). This section excludes from
the portion of the estate in which the surviving spouse is entitled to an intestate
share any property devised to a child of the testator who was born prior to the
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of the testator. The surviving spouse is not so entitled, therefore,
if the will expresses the testator's intention that the will be effec-
tive notwithstanding any subsequent marriage by the testator, or
if it is established that the testator executed the will in contem-
plation of her marriage to the surviving spouse, or if it is estab-
lished that the testator provided for her spouse through non-
probate means and did so with the intent that such provision be
in lieu of a testamentary transfer.' 97
The rationale of the statute, and similar statutes, is that the
testator who died with a premarital will in effect would have exe-
cuted a new will providing generously for the new spouse had she
not overlooked that her pre-marital will did not so provide. The
drafters of Uniform Probate Code section 2-301 explain: "This
section reflects the view that the intestate share of the spouse...
is what the testator would want the spouse to have if he or she
had thought about the relationship of his or her old will to the
new situation.' 198
To be clear, I am not arguing that the surviving committed
partner of a decedent with a valid pre-partnership will should
take a portion of any property governed by the will and not de-
vised to her. But where the decedent has died with a valid pre-
partnership will and yet partially intestate, the rationale of sec-
tion 2-301 and similar statutes relating to premarital wills sug-
gests that the pre-partnership will should not be used to support
an inference that the testator wished to exclude the surviving
partner from sharing in the decedent's intestate estate. 199 In-
deed, the premarital will statutes, and their rationale, operate in
contravention of an effectively expressed testamentary intent,
while application of the multi-factor approach in cases of partial
intestacy would govern only property not subject to an effective
testamentary expression.
In fact, I would apply my proposed accrual/multi-factor ap-
proach in all cases of partial intestacy. In cases in which the tes-
tator has not effectively expressed an intent to disinherit the
testator's marriage to the surviving spouse but who is not also a child of the surviv-
ing spouse, or is devised to any descendent of any such child. Id.
197 Id. § 2-301(a)(1-3).
198 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301, cmt. (amended 1997). See also Waggoner,
Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society, supra note 2, at 748-51.
199 Such an inference also is undermined in cases of partial intestacy in which the
testator made a significant non-residuary devise or devises to the surviving partner
or a failed residuary gift to the surviving partner.
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surviving committed partner or otherwise to distribute her pro-
bate property to others than the surviving partner, I would not
give great weight to any inference that the decedent partner
would wish to disinherit the surviving committed partner. I
would give much greater weight to the reciprocity and reliance
interests of the surviving committed partner. This balancing
compels application of the accrual/multi-factor approach to gov-
ern intestate property in cases of partial intestacy.
D. Standing to Challenge the Decedent Partner's Will
I would be more supportive of the Working Draft's restrictive
approach in cases of partial intestacy if that approach would
work to prevent challenges to a will by persons claiming to be a
surviving committed partner in cases in which the decedent at-
tempted to express testamentary intent and in which the claimed
partnership was of relatively short duration. But not applying
the multi-factor approach in cases of partial intestacy in many
such cases will not deny one claiming to be a surviving committed
partner standing to challenge the decedent partner's will. This is
so because in many such cases the surviving committed partner
will have a financial interest in seeing that a court finds the dece-
dent to have died intestate. 0°
Generally, one with a direct pecuniary interest in the failure or
partial failure of a will enjoys standing to bring a challenge
against the will. For this reason, an heir who would take a
greater amount from a decedent's intestate estate were the dece-
dent to be found to have died intestate than she would take from
the decedent's testate estate has standing to challenge the dece-
dent's will. Under the Working Draft, the surviving committed
partner is an heir if the decedent died wholly intestate. Thus, the
surviving committed partner who would take more in intestacy
than she was left under the will has a direct pecuniary interest in
arguing that the decedent died wholly intestate. It would seem,
therefore, that such a surviving committed partner would have
standing to challenge any will that is offered in probate as the
decedent's will, provided that the surviving partner's argument is
that the decedent died wholly intestate and not merely partially
intestate.
200 Pursuant to the Working Draft, a surviving committed partner is entitled to a
minimum of fifty percent of the intestate estate even in cases where the duration of
the partnership was a year or less. See infra Appendix A § (a).
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In granting intestate inheritance rights to a surviving commit-
ted partner, a multi-factor approach statute might not only ex-
pand the number of persons who have standing to challenge the
decedent's will201 but also might add a layer of litigation to the
will contest. Prerequisite to her challenge to the decedent's will,
the claimed surviving committed partner would have to demon-
strate to the court that she qualifies as a surviving committed
partner. This increased number of potential will claimants and
added complexity of the will contest litigation would undermine
the value of certainty and ease of administration even in cases
where the decedent died fully testate.
In the name of certainty and administrative convenience, my
proposal would limit the standing of a claimed surviving commit-
ted partner to challenge a decedent's will where standing is based
on the status of committed partner. I would limit standing as
follows:
Unless no other heir, aside from a claimed surviving com-
mitted partner, or no other group of heirs, not including a
claimed surviving committed partner, has a net pecuniary in-
terest in challenging respectively the decedent's will, or any
201 Depending on how a multi-factor approach statute alters who would take from
a decedent as an intestate heir, the multi-factor approach might instead decrease the
number of persons who have standing to challenge a will. For example, my pro-
posed intestacy reform would make the surviving committed partner the sole intes-
tate heir when the decedent and the surviving partner cohabited in a partnership for
a period of fifteen years or more and the decedent is not survived by a parent or a
child not also the child of the surviving committed partner. Infra Appendix B § (a)
(1)-(3). Assuming, for example, such a decedent who died survived by five siblings
as her closest blood relations, my proposal would give standing to the surviving com-
mitted partner to challenge the decedent's will on the basis of her status as an heir
but would also result in the decedent's five siblings losing standing to challenge the
decedent's will on the basis of their status as heirs.
The hypothetical above illustrates an issue of unfairness arising from extant intes-
tacy statutes: Assume twin brothers Adam and Brian are partnered respectively
with a wife of fifteen years and a non-marital partner of fifteen years. Should Adam
die survived only by his wife and his brother Brian and leaving a will devising his
estate to his wife, Brian would not have standing in many states to challenge that
will because in many states Brian would not be an intestate heir. See UNIF. PRO-
BATE CODE § 2-102(l) (providing that the surviving spouse shall take the entire in-
testate estate where no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent).
However, should Brian die survived only by his non-marital partner and Adam and
leaving a will devising his estate to his non-marital partner, in all states Adam would
have standing to challenge that will, as in all states (with the possible exceptions of
Hawaii and Vermont) Adam would be the sole intestate heir. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-103 (amended 1997) (providing that the decedent's surviving siblings shall
take the entire intestate estate where no spouse, descendant or parent of the dece-
dent survives the decedent).
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individual provision in the will, equal to or greater than the
net pecuniary interest of the claimed committed partner in
challenging respectively the decedent's will, or any individual
provision in the will, no person who would take less than fifty
percent of the decedent's intestate estate as the surviving com-
mitted partner shall have standing to challenge a decedent's
will, or individual provision in the will, by virtue of the fact
that the person is or claims to be the testator's surviving com-
mitted partner. This provision shall not defeat a person's
standing to challenge a decedent's will where standing is as-
serted on some basis other than the challenger's claimed status
as the decedent's surviving committed partner. 20 2
Recall that, pursuant to my proposed accrual approach, a sur-
viving committed partner does not take fifty percent or more of
the decedent partner's intestate estate unless she and the dece-
dent partner cohabited in a partnership of nine years or greater
duration.20 3 Thus, my proposal would limit standing to challenge
a decedent's will in many cases so that a claimed surviving com-
mitted partner will not have standing to challenge a decedent's
will (where standing is based on committed partner status) unless
she is able to demonstrate that she and the decedent enjoyed a
cohabiting partnership of nine years or greater duration. I think
it reasonable to hypothesize that in most cases of claimed rela-
tionships of such long duration, the evidence of the committed
partnership will be compelling. Thus, in most such cases, the
claimant's need to demonstrate to the court that she qualifies as a
surviving committed partner should not lead in and of itself to
prolonged litigation.20 4
Regardless of the claimed duration of the claimed committed
partnership, however, my proposal would not operate to deny
standing to a claimed surviving committed partner to challenge a
decedent's will if no other heir or group of heirs collectively has a
202 Infra Appendix B § (c).
203 Id. § (a)(1).
204 While it might further promote certainty and ease of administration if my ap-
proach were to deny the surviving committed partner standing to challenge a will in
all cases, such an approach would be unacceptable in that it would result in cases in
which no person had standing to challenge a will. For example, where the decedent
dies survived by a committed partner of a relationship of more than fifteen years
duration but is not survived by a descendant not also a descendant of the surviving
committed partner and is not survived by a parent, the survivor committed partner
would be the sole intestate heir. See infra Appendix B § (a) (1)-(3). If one offered
into probate a document purporting to be the decedent's only will, and if the surviv-
ing committed partner is denied standing to challenge that will, no person would
have standing to challenge that will.
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net pecuniary interest in challenging respectively the decedent's
will, or any provision thereof, equal to or greater than that of the
claimed committed partner. Assume, for example, that the dece-
dent has died testate survived only by a brother and a surviving
committed partner from a relationship that was of eight years
duration. Had the decedent died intestate, her brother would be
entitled under my accrual approach to 52% of the decedent's in-
testate estate. The surviving committed partner would be enti-
tled to 48% of the decedent's intestate estate. 0 5 Whether or not
the surviving committed partner would have standing to chal-
lenge the decedent's will would depend on the will's distribution
scheme.
Let's assume three alternate testamentary schemes. First, let's
assume that the testator devised all of her property to her favor-
ite charity. In this case, the testator's brother has a pecuniary
interest in challenging the will greater than that of the surviving
committed partner: If the will is held to be invalid, he will have a
net gain of 52% of the testator's estate and the surviving commit-
ted partner will have a net gain of 48% of the testator's estate.
The surviving committed partner, therefore, would not have
standing under my proposal to challenge the will. My approach
relies on the unity of interests between the brother and the sur-
viving committed partner in seeking to prevent probate of a will
that does not reflect the testator's true wishes and, simultane-
ously in this case, to protect the interests of the surviving com-
mitted partner.
Next, let's assume that the testator devised all of her property
to her brother. In this case, the surviving committed partner has
a pecuniary interest in challenging the will greater than that of
any other heir or group of other heirs.20 6 If the court finds the
testator to have died intestate, the brother suffers a net loss of
48% of the decedent's estate while the surviving committed part-
ner enjoys a net gain of 48% of the decedent's estate. In such a
circumstance, we cannot rely on the brother to protect the surviv-
ing committed partner's interest (or to seek to prevent probate of
a will that does not reflect the testator's true wishes). For this
reason, my proposal would extend standing to challenge the de-
cedent's will to the surviving committed partner even though she
205 Infra Appendix B § (a)(1).
206 Indeed, there is only one other heir-the brother-in my hypothetical.
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would stand to inherit less than 50% of the decedent's intestate
estate as the surviving committed partner.
Finally, let's assume that the testator devised one-half of the
value of her property to her favorite charity and one-half of the
value of her property to her brother. Let's further assume that
even if these are deemed to be residuary gifts, the relevant law is
that there is no residue of a residue, so that should either gift fail,
the gift would pass by intestacy. In this case, my proposal would
deny standing to the surviving committed partner to assert any
challenge that goes only to the devise to the charity. This is be-
cause the brother has a pecuniary interest in challenging that de-
vise that is not less than the pecuniary interest that the surviving
committed partner has in challenging the devise.2 °7 My proposal,
however, would not deny standing to the surviving committed
partner to assert any challenge that goes only to the devise to the
brother. The surviving committed partner obviously would gain
more from such a challenge if successful than would the brother
who would keep only fifty-two cents in intestacy for every dollar
that he lost in the will challenge-a net loss. Finally, my proposal
also would not deny standing to the surviving committed partner
to assert any challenge that goes to the entire will. It is true that
the brother will take 52% of the estate if the challenge is success-
ful while the surviving committed partner will take only 48% of
the estate. But the surviving committed partner has a greater
pecuniary interest in the lawsuit: She will enjoy a net gain of
48% of the estate if the court finds the decedent to have died
intestate, while the brother would enjoy a net gain of only 2%.2°s
207 The brother would gain 52% of the property that the charity loses, while the
surviving committed partner would gain only 48% of the property that the charity
loses.
208 Similarly, when the issue is whether a group of heirs has a net pecuniary inter-
est in challenging the will equal to or greater than the claimed committed partner's
net pecuniary interest in challenging the will, it is the net gain of the group as a
whole that is the relevant point of comparison. Infra Appendix B § (c). For exam-
ple, assume that the decedent has died survived only by her committed partner of 61h
years and the decedent's four siblings-Anna, Brian, Chris, and Danny. Under my
accrual approach, the partner is entitled to 36% of the intestate estate and each of
the siblings is entitled to 16% of the intestate estate. See id. § (a). Assume further
that a will is offered for probate that devises property worth 25% of the estate each
to Anna and Brian and the residue of the estate to charity.
The committed partner will have standing to bring a challenge to the entire will
because no "group of heirs" would have a pecuniary interest as great as hers in
challenging the entire will. As a group, the siblings would enjoy a net gain from a
finding of intestacy: They would take 64% of the estate under intestacy as con-
trasted with 50% of the estate under the will. This net gain of 14% of the estate,
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IV
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFICATION AS A
SURVIVING COMMITTED PARTNER
My proposed intestacy scheme seeks to focus the inquiry into
whether a claimant qualifies as a surviving committed partner on
several objective factors and various subjective factors that di-
rectly implicate one or more of the values of donative intent, rec-
iprocity, reliance, and ease of administration.
A. The Objective Requirements
My proposal borrows from Professor Waggoner's Working
Draft the objective requirements that the surviving committed
partner have been an unmarried adult at the decedent's death
who would not have been prohibited under the law of the rele-
vant jurisdiction from marrying the decedent on account of the
blood or adoptive relationship between the claimant and the de-
cedent.20 9 I concur with Professor Waggoner's judgment that the
absence of any of these factors undermines to too great a degree
however, is less than the net gain of 36% of the estate that the surviving committed
partner would enjoy if the decedent were found to have died intestate. Moreover no
subgroup of siblings would enjoy a net pecuniary gain from a successful challenge to
the entire will as large as that of the committed partner. The subgroup of Chris and
Danny would come closest with a net gain of 32% of the estate.
The committed partner would not have standing, however, to challenge only the
gift to charity. The siblings as a group have a greater pecuniary interest in such a
challenge: They would take 64% of the property that the charity would lose
whereas the committed partner would take only 36% of the property that the charity
would lose. This is a net gain of 32% of the estate by the siblings versus a net gain of
18% of the estate by the committed partner. Therefore, the committed partner may
not bring such a challenge.
Nor would the committed partner have standing to challenge only the gift to Anna
or only the gift to Brian. The committed partner would gain 36% of any property
lost by, for example, Anna-a net gain of 9% of the estate. But the subgroup of
siblings consisting of Brian, Chris, and Danny would gain 48% of this property-a
net gain of 12% of the estate.
209 See infra Appendix A § (b). With respect to the qualification that the claimant
and the decedent must not have been within a familial relationship to each other
that would have disqualified them from marrying each other, the Working Draft
actually provides that the claimant must "not [have been] prohibited from marrying
the decedent under the law of this state by reason of a blood relationship of the
decedent." Id. I propose expanding this language to include also adoptive relation-
ships that the governing state's law makes relevant in disqualifying the relatives
from marrying each other. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 207, cmt.
("Marriages of brothers and sisters by adoption are prohibited because of the social
interest in discouraging romantic attachments between such persons even if there is
no genetic risk.").
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our ability to be confident in attributing to the decedent an inten-
tion to benefit the claimant.210
1. Cohabitation for a Minimum Duration as an Absolute
Prerequisite to Taking an Intestate Share
My proposal also shares in common with the Working Draft
the absolute requirement that the decedent and the surviving
committed partner had cohabited. My proposal's requirements
with respect to cohabitation differ, however, from those of the
Working Draft in two important respects. First, the Working
Draft requires that the surviving committed partner and the de-
cedent have been cohabiting at the decedent's death in order for
the surviving partner to take an intestate share. My approach,
however, allows the survivor of a recently-fractured partnership
to take a discounted intestate share in certain cases, for reasons
that I have discussed above.211
Second, the Working Draft does not employ any minimum co-
habitation period that must be satisfied before a surviving com-
mitted partner may take an intestate share. My proposal,
however, for reasons discussed below, employs a minimum co-
habiting partnership duration-three years--before the surviving
committed partner may take any portion of the decedent's intes-
tate estate. 12
Professor Waggoner's Working Draft requires that a surviving
committed partner, at the decedent's death, have been sharing a
common household with the decedent.213 The Working Draft de-
fines "sharing a common household" to mean "that the decedent
and the individual shared the same place to live, whether or not
one or both had other places to live and whether or not one or
both were physically residing somewhere else at the decedent's
210 See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 81. Professor Wag-
goner points out also that the requirement that the decedent have been unmarried at
her death precludes the possibility that a court would be called on under the Work-
ing Draft to allocate property between a spouse and a person claiming to be a sur-
viving committed partner. Id. at 81 n.146.
211 See supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text (discussing the discounting ap-
proach after a fracture of the partnership).
212 See Oldham, supra note 1, at 1421 (stating that with respect to the regulation
of unmarried opposite-sex cohabitants, "[a]lmost all commentators, as well as the
drafters of the ALl proposal, accept that some 'trial' period should be accepted
where no rights arise [unless the parties agree to the contrary"]).
213 Infra Appendix A § (b)(iii).
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death." '214 Defining cohabitation in this manner allows for equal
inclusion of couples in which the partners were physically resid-
ing apart during a portion of their cohabiting partnership due to
"job-related or involuntary separation, such as where one or the
other [partner] was on a military mission, was in prison, was hos-
pitalized, or was in a nursing home. 215
Professor Waggoner chose not to define a "surviving commit-
ted partner" so as to require that the partner and the decedent
had cohabited for a specified minimum duration. He did not
wish to preclude in all cases the survivor of a short-term partner-
ship of great commitment from demonstrating that she is deserv-
ing of an intestate share of the decedent's estate.216 Rather,
Professor Waggoner chose to incorporate into the Working Draft
a presumption that arises based on a cohabitation period of a
specified duration. The Working Draft presumes that a claim-
ant's relationship with the decedent was sufficiently committed 217
such that the claimant who otherwise satisfies the objective ele-
ments of the Working Draft should qualify for an intestate share
of the decedent's estate if the claimant and the decedent cohab-
ited for periods totaling five years during the six years immedi-
ately preceding the decedent's death.2 t8 Thus, under the
Working Draft, a claimant need not prove a cohabitation period
of any specified duration, but she would find it helpful to her
claim if she could do SO. 2 1 9
214 Id. § (c). The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Disso-
lution define cohabitation for the purpose of qualifying cohabitants as domestic
partners as follows: "Persons maintain a common household when they share a pri-
mary residence only with each other and family members; or when, if they share a
household with other unrelated persons, they act jointly, rather than as individuals,
with respect to management of the household." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(4).
215 Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 81 n.145.
216 Id. at 86 & n.158.
217 The Working Draft does not use the term "sufficiently committed" but rather
inquires into whether the relationship at issue was sufficiently "marriage-like." In-
fra Appendix A §§ (b)(iii), (d).
218 Infra Appendix A § (e)(1). One opposing the claimant may rebut this pre-
sumption by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the presumption arises in con-
junction with another of several other factors also giving rise to such a presumption,
in which case the opponent may rebut the presumption only by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. § (f).
219 The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution sim-
ilarly provide for a rebuttable presumption that persons not related by blood or
adoption are domestic partners when the persons have maintained a common house-
hold for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a "cohabitation period, set in a
rule of statewide application." This presumption may be rebutted upon a showing
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My proposal adopts the Working Draft's definition of "sharing
a common household" as its definition of cohabitation.22 0  My
proposal requires as a prerequisite for her taking an intestate
share that a surviving committed partner had cohabited with the
decedent in that the unreduced intestate share percentage is de-
termined by the length of time in which the couple "cohabited in
a partnership." '221 Recall that, at the high end of the scale, if the
decedent and the surviving committed partner cohabited in a
partnership for a period of at least fifteen years, the unreduced
intestate share percentage is one hundred percent of the intestate
estate. At the low end of the scale, if the decedent and the sur-
viving committed partner cohabited in a partnership for a period
of at least three years but less than four years, the unreduced
intestate share percentage is eighteen percent of the intestate es-
tate. If the claimant did not cohabit in a partnership with the
decedent for a period of at least three years, she shall not be
entitled to any portion of the intestate estate.222
Requiring cohabitation in a partnership for a period of at least
three years as a prerequisite to the claimed surviving committed
partner taking any portion of the intestate estate well balances
and serves all four values that ground my intestacy scheme. Con-
sider first generally the rationale for distinguishing between
claimants who cohabited with the decedent and those who did
not. The rationale for such an approach is that the absence of
cohabitation by the putative partners is an excellent marker for
insufficient commitment-as the intestacy scheme defines com-
that the two people "did not share a life together as a couple." PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(3). The
Principles further provide a rule that persons who have maintained a common
household along with their common child for a continuous period that equals or
exceeds a "cohabitation parenting period, set in a rule of statewide application" are
domestic partners. Id. § 6.03(2).
Under the Principles, when a claimant has not maintained a common household
with the putative domestic partner for a specified cohabitation period or maintained
a common household with the putative domestic partner and their common child for
a specified cohabiting parenting period, the claimant must not only show that the
parties cohabited and shared a life together as a couple, but also that they did so "for
a significant period of time." Id. at § 6.03(6). Reliance is central to the inquiry into
whether such a period of time is "significant" under the Principles. Whether the
period of time is significant "is determined in light of all the Paragraph (7) circum-
stances of the parties' relationship and, particularly, the extent to which those cir-
cumstances have wrought change in the life of one or both parties." Id.
220 See infra Appendix B § (a)(i).
221 See id. § (a)(1).
222 See id.
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mitment22 3 The principal virtue of a cohabitation requirement is
that it provides a largely objective means to lock from the court-
house an entire group of potential claimants who, on the whole,
would be unlikely to succeed even absent the absolute bar.
Next, consider the cohabitation requirement in light of the val-
ues that ground my proposed intestacy scheme. It seems reason-
able to conclude that in cases in which the claimant has not
cohabited with the decedent, the decedent would not likely have
wanted her estate to provide for the claimant after the decedent's
death, the claimant is not likely to have engaged in care-taking
with respect to the decedent and is not likely to have contributed
to the decedent's economic well-being, and the claimant is not
likely to have relied upon her relationship with the decedent to
the claimant's economic detriment. It seems reasonable to con-
clude, therefore, that the vast majority (and too many) of likely
claimants who have not cohabited with the decedent would be
unable to show by clear and convincing evidence that they have
developed the type of relationship-"life together with the dece-
dent as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate part-
nership ""'-such that they will succeed in convincing the court
applying my scheme that they should take a share of the dece-
dent's intestate estate. In furtherance of administrative conve-
nience, my proposed scheme does not let any of them try.
I believe the reasoning that grounds my intestacy scheme hav-
ing any cohabitation requirement supports also extending the re-
quirement to bar claims by those who did not cohabit in a
partnership with the decedent for at least three years. I have
sought to select a minimum cohabiting partnership period of
such duration that it will serve as an absolute bar only to those
persons in a pool of otherwise potential claimants the majority of
which clearly would be unlikely to succeed, even absent the bar,
in demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence a partnership
evidencing the donative intent, reciprocity and reliance interests
that my proposed intestacy scheme seeks to recognize . 2 5 The
223 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 6.04, cmt. a ("The period during which the parties shared a pri-
mary residence can ordinarily be established with objective evidence, and in most
cases is substantially congruent with the period during which the parties shared life
together as a couple").
224 See infra Appendix B § (b)(2).
225 ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., supra note 11, at 121 (law reform commission ar-
guing that "[tlhe three-year [minimum] period along with the requirement that the
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theory of my proposal is that even if the decedent of a relation-
ship with less than a three-year cohabiting partnership period is
likely to have wanted the survivor to share in her estate, such a
relationship is unlikely to have given rise to reciprocity and reli-
ance interests of the type that my proposal seeks to protect.
Moreover, given that my proposal places the burden on the
claimant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
her relationship with the decedent should qualify her as a surviv-
ing committed partner,226 the survivor of a relationship of very
short duration is likely to be handicapped in carrying her burden
by the lack of any conduct enduring over a significant period of
time that might be helpful to the court in evaluating the nature of
the relationship. The Alberta Law Institute has commented on
the importance of evaluating a relationship over a significant pe-
riod of time in support of its recommendation for reform of the
Alberta Intestate Succession Act, which reform would employ a
minimum three-year cohabitation period before a claimant might
assert a claim as a surviving committed partner to a share of a
decedent's intestate estate:
It is just too difficult, if not impossible, to determine if a rela-
tionship is marriage-like unless one has a significant period of
conduct upon which to base this judgment. The reason for this
is that the daily life of couples living within marriage or
outside marriage is similar. What differs is the commitment to
the permanence of the relationship and this can only be
judged with time....
We remain of the view that the three-year period is the appro-
priate period. A shorter period is likely to catch casual rela-
tionships and trial marriages and in such relationships, it is
unlikely the deceased would want the surviving cohabitant to
share in the estate. The relationships we are trying to identify
are those which are stable and have a commitment to perma-
nence. A minimum period of cohabitation is required to evi-
dence these characteristics. 227
The length of the minimum period need not be set, however,
to prevent a windfall for those who pass the bar. This is because
my scheme uses an accrual approach to determine the size of the
intestate share that the surviving committed partner takes. Thus,
relationship be marriage-like will be a sufficient marker of the type of relationship in
which the deceased would want the surviving cohabitant to share in his or her
estate").
226 See infra Appendix B § (b)(2).
227 ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., supra note 11, at 119-21.
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once it is determined that one qualifies as a committed partner,
the size of the intestate share must still be determined. That de-
termination will be made with respect to the duration of the co-
habiting partnership period.
The ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and ac-
companying comments are instructive with respect to this dichot-
omy. The Principles provide for certain financial consequences
upon the termination by fracture of a qualifying domestic part-
nership . 2 8 First, the Principles call for the allocation of "domes-
tic-partnership property" upon the fracture of the qualifying
domestic partnership. In general, upon dissolution of the part-
nership, each partner is presumptively entitled to domestic-part-
nership property worth one half of the total value of domestic-
partnership property that is owned by either partner.229  The
Principles define domestic-partnership property as property that
would have been marital property under the Principles had the
domestic partners been married for the duration of their domes-
228 The Principles seek to promote two goals through their rules governing the
financial consequences of the dissolution by fracture of a domestic partnership.
First, the rules seek to fairly distribute the financial gains and losses arising from the
termination of the domestic partnership. And second, the rules seek to protect soci-
ety from having to support one of the former domestic partners when that support
more appropriately should be provided by the other former domestic partner. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-MENDA-
TIONS § 6.02. Where a jurisdiction has adopted the Principles or similar standards
giving rise to financial rights and obligations upon the fracture of a committed part-
nership, consistency and a policy favoring promotion of stability in intimate relation-
ships would dictate that the jurisdiction also give inheritance rights to the survivor of
a partnership that lasted until the death of one of them. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.2, cmt. g:
To the extent that a domestic partner is treated as having the status of a
spouse, conferring rights on such a partner on the dissolution of the rela-
tionship, the domestic partner who remains in that relationship with the
decedent until the decedent's death should be treated as a legal spouse for
purposes of intestacy.
229 Section 6.05 of the Principles, in conjunction with Sections 4.09 and 4.10 of the
Principles, calls for the allocation of "domestic-partnership property" upon the frac-
ture of the qualifying domestic partnership. Section 6.05 provides quite simply that
"[d]omestic-partnership property should be divided according to the principles set
forth for the division of marital property in § 4.09 and § 4.10." PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.05. Sec-
tions 4.09 and 4.10 provide generally that, at dissolution of the marriage, each spouse
is presumptively entitled to one half of the marital property owned by either spouse.
Section 4.09(l) provides that generally "marital property and marital debts are di-
vided at dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in value, although
not necessarily identical in kind." Id. § 4.09.
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tic-partnership period.23° The Principles further provide that,
generally, property earned by either spouse during the marriage
is marital property.231 Thus, under the Principles, generally,
property that is earned by either domestic partner during the do-
mestic partnership is domestic-partnership property.
Second, the Principles call for "compensatory payments"
(analogous to alimony) for certain domestic partners.232 In order
to qualify for a compensatory payment, the domestic partner first
must show that she has incurred a compensable loss arising from
the fracture of the domestic partnership into separate economic
units.233 Examples of compensable losses include (1) a loss in
earning capacity. of one domestic partner that she incurred dur-
ing the domestic partnership and that continues after the domes-
tic partnership and -that is related to her performing a
disproportionate share ofthe care of the children of either do-
mestic partner,234 and, (2) only when the domestic partnership is
230 Id. § 6.04(l). Paragraph 2 of Section 6.04 provides that:
The domestic-partnership period
(a) starts when the domestic partners began sharing a primary residence,
unless either partner shows that the parties did not begin sharing life to-
gether as a couple until a later date, in which case the domestic-partnership
period starts on that later date, and
(b) ends when the parties ceased sharing a primary residence.
For the purpose of this Paragraph, parties who are the biological parents of
a common child began sharing life together as a couple no later than the
date on which their common child was conceived.
Id. § 604(2).
231 See id. § 4.03 (providing that "[p]roperty acquired during marriage is marital
property" except that "[i]nheritances, including bequests and devises, and gifts from
third parties, are the separate property of the acquiring spouse even if acquired dur-
ing marriage" and "[p]roperty acquired during marriage but after the parties have
commenced living apart pursuant to either a written separation agreement or a judi-
cial decree, is the separate property of the acquiring spouse unless the agreement or
decree specifies otherwise").
232 Section 6.06 of the Principles provides that generally:
(a) a domestic partner is entitled to compensatory payments on the same
basis as a spouse under Chapter 5, and
(b) wherever a rule implementing a Chapter 5 principle makes the dura-
tion of the marriage a relevant factor, the application of that principle in
this Chapter should instead employ the duration of the domestic-partner-
ship period, as defined in § 6.04(2).
Id. § 6.06.
233 See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.03 (listing the kinds of losses that are compensable
with compensatory payments).
234 Id. § 5.05.
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of a qualifying duration, a loss in living standard experienced by
one of the domestic partners upon dissolution of the partnership
that is attributable to. the fact -that the claimant domestic partner
has significantly less wealth or earning capacity than the other
domestic partner.235 In general, the amount of the compensatory
payment to which a domestic partner is entitled relating to these
compensable losses is proportional to (a) the disparity in income
between the claimant domestic. partner and her fellow domestic
partner and (b) the duration of the domestic partnership or the
child care period.236
Thus, under the Principles, that one qualifies as a domestic
partner does not in itself entitle one at fracture of the partnership
to an allocation of any property owned by the other domestic
partner and does not, without more, qualify one for compensa-
tory payments. This has implications for the choice of duration
of the minimum cohabitation period and minimum cohabitation
parenting period, which each jurisdiction adopting the Principles
must set for itself, that give rise under the Principles to a pre-
235 Id. § 5.04.
236 For example, Section 5.04 of the Principles, entitled "Compensation for Loss
of Marital Living Standard," provides:
(1) A person married to someone with significantly greater wealth or earn-
ing capacity is entitled at dissolution to compensation for a portion of the
loss in the standard of living he or she would otherwise experience, when
the marriage was of sufficient duration that equity requires that some por-
tion of the loss be treated as the spouses' joint responsibility.
(2) Entitlement to an award under this section should be determined by a
rule of statewide application under which a presumption of entitlement
arises in marriages of specified duration and spousal. income disparity.
(3) The value of the award made under this section should be determined
by a rule of statewide application that sets a presumptive award of periodic
payments calculated by applying a specified percentage to the difference
between the incomes the spouses are expected to have after dissolution.
This percentage is referred to in this Chapter as the durational factor, and
should increase with the duration of the marriage until it reaches a maxi-
mum value set by the rule.
Id. § 5.04.
A comment to this section illustrates an application of this principle as follows:
A presumption arises that a spouse is entitled to an award under this sec-
tion whenever that spouse has been married five years or more to a person
whose income at dissolution is expected to be at least 25 percent greater
than the claimant's. The presumptive award shall equal the difference in
the spouses' expected incomes at dissolution, multiplied by the appropriate
durational factor. The durational factor is equal to the years of marriage
multiplied by .01, but shall in no case exceed .4.
Id. § 5.04 cmt. a, illus. .
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sumption that two cohabitants are domestic partners. 37 A com-
ment to section 6.03 of the Principles explains that these
minimum periods are meant to promote administrative conve-
nience but are not needed as guards against windfall awards:
This section requires that adopting jurisdictions specify a
Paragraph (2) cohabitation parenting period and a Paragraph
(3) cohabitation period. Persons treated as domestic partners
under this section must also meet the requirements of Chapter
5 in order to obtain an award of compensatory payments.
Chapter 5 imposes its own durational thresholds for award eli-
gibility. In addition, for those meeting the threshold require-
ment, the value of any award of compensatory payments is
ordinarily proportional to the duration of the parties' cohabi-
tation. The amount of the parties' property subject to division
under section 6.05 will also, in the ordinary case, be propor-
tional to the duration of the parties' cohabitation. Thus, this
section does not require long cohabitation periods to screen
out inappropriate compensatory-payment awards or property-
distribution awards.
The required durations do need to be long enough to make
it likely that the parties have established a life together as a
couple and that their life together as a couple has had some
significant impact on the circumstances of one or both
parties. 238
Similarly, my proposed intestacy scheme sets at three years the
minimum cohabiting partnership duration because, in my theory,
this is the period at which there is first a likelihood that the rela-
tionship between the decedent and the surviving claimant has
given rise to the donative intent, reciprocity and reliance inter-
ests that my intestacy proposal seeks to protect.239 In light of this
likelihood, my proposal allows the survivors of relationships with
237 In the case of the presumption arising with respect to a cohabiting period, the
presumption is rebuttable. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS ANI) RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(3). In the case of the "presumption"
arising with respect to a cohabiting parenting period, the "presumption" is not re-
buttable. Id. § 6.03(2).
238 Id. § 6.03 cmt. d (internal citations omitted).
239 See Oldham, supra note 1, at 1421-22 (noting empirical studies showing that of
U.S. opposite-sex cohabitants who do not marry, "one-sixth last three years and
about 10% last five years" in support of acceptance of a three-year "safe-harbor"
period before rights would arise from the cohabitation); ALTA. LAW REFORM INST.,
supra note 11, at 114-15 (noting that of the various Canadian provincial statutes that
have extended protections to cohabitants in the areas of intestacy, support obliga-
tions, family relief, and wrongful death most require cohabitation for a specified
minimum period (ranging from one to five years), with the most common such pe-
riod being three years); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992) (providing a spouse's
intestate share to a surviving non-marital partner of an opposite-sex non-marital
[Vol. 81, 20021
HeinOnline  -- 81 Or. L. Rev. 324 2002
Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners
such a cohabiting partnership duration into the courthouse. The
portion of the decedent's intestate estate to which the survivor is
entitled, if any, is then proportional to the duration of the
couple's cohabiting partnership. Whether the survivor who has
gotten through the courthouse door is entitled to any such por-
tion, however, is determined by the court using a subjective
multi-factor analysis.
B. The Subjective Inquiry Weighing Multiple Factors
Under my proposal, a surviving committed partner is one who
satisfies all of the objective elements set out above in this Article
and, in addition, satisfies at least one of two additional criteria.
The otherwise qualified claimant may succeed and take an intes-
tate share by demonstrating that, during the decedent's life, she
and the decedent registered as each others' domestic partner in
accordance with the State's requirements and procedures for the
registration of domestic partnerships. In the alternative, the
claimant may demonstrate:
[B]y clear and convincing evidence that the claimant lived her
or his life together with the decedent as a couple in an emo-
tionally and physically intimate partnership such that the in-
testacy scheme should protect the decedent's interest in
donative freedom, or the surviving committed partner's reci-
procity or reliance interests, by awarding to the survivor a por-
tion of the decedent's intestate estate. 240
1. Factors Evidencing an Emotionally and Physically Intimate
Partnership
My proposed statute lists twenty-three factors, grouped into
four categories, that the court shall consider and give weight to in
making the subjective determination as to whether the claimant
has met her burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the claimant and the decedent lived life together as a couple
partnership in which the partners cohabited and held themselves out as husband and
wife for at least a three-year period immediately preceding the intestate's death).
240 Infra Appendix B § (b)(2). I have drafted this phrase with the intent that a
court must first find that the claimant and the decedent lived as a couple in an emo-
tionally and physically intimate partnership and, second, must find that their rela-
tionship also profoundly implicated at least one, but not necessarily more than one,
of the three values-donative intent, reciprocity and reliance. My proposal places
the burden on one opposing the qualification of a claimant as a surviving committed
partner to demonstrate that the decedent and the claimant did not share physical
intimacy at any time during their relationship. Id. § (b)(2)(v).
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in such an emotionally and physically intimate partnership.
Many of these factors derive from and are analogous to factors
set out in Professor Waggoner's Working Draft or the American
Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution that
are to be utilized in a determination of whether a claimant is,
respectively, a surviving committed partner or a domestic part-
ner.241 The Working Draft utilizes a multi-factor inquiry into
whether the claimant's relationship with the decedent was "mar-
riage-like"-that is-"a relationship.., in which two individuals
have chosen to share one another's lives in a long-term, intimate,
and committed relationship of mutual caring." '242 The Principles
241 See infra Appendix A § (d); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7). Section 6.03(7) of the Princi-
ples sets out factors that a court should consider relevant in making its
determination as to whether a claimant was a domestic partner:
Whether persons share a life together as a couple is determined by refer-
ence to all the circumstances, including:
(a) the oral or written statements or promises made to one another, or
representations jointly made to third parties, regarding their
relationship;
(b) the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances;
(c) the extent to which their relationship fostered the parties' economic
interdependence, or the economic dependence of one party upon the
other;
(d) the extent to which the parties engaged in conduct and assumed spe-
cialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together;
(e) the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the life of
either or both parties;
(f) the extent to which the parties acknowledged responsibilities to each
other; as by naming the other the beneficiary of life insurance or of a
testamentary instrument, or as eligible to receive benefits under an em-
ployee benefit plan;
(g) the extent to which the parties' relationship was treated by the par-
ties as qualitatively distinct from the relationship either party had with
any other person;
(h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties' relationship;
(i) the parties' community reputation as a couple;
(j) the parties' participation in a commitment ceremony or registration
as a domestic partnership;
(k) the parties' participation in a void or voidable marriage that, under
applicable law, does not give rise to the economic incidents of marriage;
(1) the parties' procreation of, adoption of, or joint assumption of paren-
tal functions toward a child;
(m) the parties' maintenance of a common household, as defined by
Paragraph (4).
Id.
242 Infra Appendix A §§ (b), (d). Professor Waggoner chose to focus the multi-
factor inquiry on whether a relationship was "marriage-like," in part, because he
believed that a judge would be likely to know what "marriage-like" was when she
[Vol. 81, 2002]
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of the Law of Family Dissolution utilizes a multi-factor inquiry
into whether two persons shared "life together as a couple. 24
3
I prefer that an intestacy scheme not evaluate and reward a
non-marital partnership based on whether or not the relationship
was sufficiently "marriage-like ' 244 because I believe that term is
not sufficiently precise 245 and also raises distracting political is-
sues. 2 46 " I think it preferable to focus the court's inquiry more
directly on the values that the intestacy scheme wishes to pro-
mote or reward. Even if we derive those values and, therefore,
the desired qualities in a relationship from our appreciation of an
ideal of marriage, it should be possible for us to define the requi-
site qualities of a qualifying committed partnership without mak-
ing reference to marriage in focusing the court's inquiry. We
saw it. E-mail from Lawrence Waggoner to Gary Spitko (Dec. 28, 2001) (on file
with the author). See also Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 27.
There is a substantial benefit of using marital relationships as the standard
for evaluating the degree of commitment and the likelihood that the dece-
dent would have intended the person to share in the estate; it is a standard
familiar to the courts and one they likely will feel comfortable applying.
Id. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 373, 383 (2001) (pointing out how both employers and courts set out criteria
for qualification as a domestic partnerwith reference to the characteristics that "are
thought to accompany or constitute marriage").
243 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 6.03(1).
244 See Stephen A. James, "As If They Were Husband and Wife:" A Critique of
De Facto Relationship Property Law in Victoria 15:1 LAW IN CONTEXT 53, 60-61
(1997) (labeling as "ironic" the notion that recognition of a non-marital partnership
would depend upon the degree to which the partners "lived together as if they were
husband and wife" given that a purpose of the recognition is to acknowledge the
diversity of relationships).
245 See id. at 61 (arguing that use of marriage-like as a standard "seems to imply a
monolithic experience which glosses over diversity even within heterosexual
marriage").
246 See Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 9, at 1099-102. The author notes
the political opposition to treating same-sex relationships as on a par with marital
relationships and argues that:
[T]o the extent that a reformed Article II [of the Uniform Probate Code]
limits intestate inheritance rights to non-marital relationships with a requi-
site level of 'marriage-like' commitment and responsibility, extension of in-
testate inheritance rights to same-sex partnerships would necessarily be an
acknowledgment that such commitment and responsibility do exist within
some gay and lesbian relationships.
Id. See also Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 27 (noting that "a
statutory requirement that insists on committed couples 'mimicking' marriage may
be politically unappealing to LGBT communities [because t]hey might reason that it
increases the potential of reinforcing heterosexual norms" and "also may be prob-
lematic for some opposite-sex couples who have rejected marriage because of its
patriarchal underpinnings").
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might consider first the desired qualities of a traditional marriage
that we wish to promote or reward in including only certain rela-
tionships within our definition of a qualifying committed partner-
ship. We might then draft our definition of a qualifying
committed partnership with those qualities explicitly included.24 7
For example, the American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution define a "domestic partner" as, "two
persons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another,
who for a significant period of time share a primary residence
and a life together as a couple. ' 248 The definition makes no ref-
erence to marriage. Yet, the comments to the Principles make
clear that the drafters had as a model an ideal of marital life
when they drafted a list of factors that would guide the court in
deciding whether two partners "shared .. .a life together as a
couple. 2 4 9
I have sought to focus the court's subjective inquiry into the
nature of the claimant's relationship with the decedent directly
on the values that ground my intestacy scheme by having the
court focus on whether the claimant and the decedent lived "as a
couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership
such that the intestacy scheme should protect the decedent's in-
terest in donative freedom, or the surviving committed partner's
reciprocity or reliance interests, by awarding to the survivor a
portion of the decedent's intestate estate. ' 250 . Moreover, in seek-
ing to have the court maintain this focus, I have grouped the enu-
merated factors that the court must consider into four categories,
each of which relates to one prong of this fundamental and ulti-
mate question.
First, the court shall consider and give weight to any factors
247 See Hernandez, supra note 135, at 1006-07 ("The functional approach [to de-
fining family] legitimizes non-nuclear relationships that share the essential qualities
of traditional relationships for a given context by inquiring whether a relationship
shares the main characteristics of caring, commitment, economic cooperation and
participation in domestic responsibilities.").
248 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 6.03(1).
249 Id. § 6.03, cmt. e ("Whether parties shared life together as a couple is deter-
mined by reference to all the circumstances listed in Paragraph (7), which are in-
tended to ascertain whether the parties conducted themselves as spouses normally
do in the course of family life."). See also id. § 6.02, cmt. a ("Domestic relationships
that satisfy the criteria of § 6.03 closely resemble marriages in function, and their
termination therefore poses the same social and legal issues as does the dissolution
of a marriage.").
250 See Appendix B § (b)(2).
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that tend to demonstrate that the claimant lived or did not live
her or his life together with the decedent as a couple in an emo-
tionally and physically intimate partnership, including but not
limited to the following factors: evidence that the parties were
physically intimate with each other;251 whether the couple joined
in a marriage ceremony or a commitment ceremony;252 whether
the couple registered with an employer as domestic partners, if
such registration was an option and would have been beneficial;
whether one or both of the parties nominated the other as her or
his agent to make health care decisions;253 the parties' reputation
in their community or communities as a couple;254 whether the
parties made joint gifts to charity together;255 whether the parties
celebrated holidays, their birthdays, and their anniversaries to-
gether; whether the parties exchanged with each other symbols
of their relationship, such as rings or engraved jewelry;2 56 and
whether the parties agreed to be buried after their deaths next to
each other or agreed that the survivor should take possession of
the ashes of the first to die.257
Second, the court shall consider and give weight to any factors
that tend to demonstrate that the decedent would or would not
have wanted her or his estate to provide for the claimant after
the decedent's death, including but not limited to the following
factors: whether the decedent devised property by will or at-
tempted to do so and, if so, whether the decedent named the
claimant as a devisee or attempted to do so;258 whether the dece-
251 See. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FACULTY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(h).
252 See infra Appendix A § (d)(5); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(j), (k).
253 See infra Appendix A § (d)(3).
254 See infra Appendix A § (d)(6); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(i).
255 Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 63.
256 See id. at 59-61 (reporting a survey showing a positive correlation between the
surveyed partner having exchanged with her or his partner a symbol of their rela-
tionship, such as a ring or other jewelry, and a preference that the surviving partner
of a hypothesized non-marital couple take a larger share of the decedent partner's
estate).
257 See id. at 55 (reporting a survey in which 6.7% of respondents with opposite-
sex partners and 5.9% of respondents with same-sex partners had arranged to be
buried next to each other).
2 5 8 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(f). See also Robbennolt & Kirkpatrick Johnson, supra
note 1, at 441 (reporting that "[o]f those respondents [in a survey of non-marital
committed partners] who had wills .... [o]ver 90% of respondents with same-sex
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dent utilized will substitutes to pass property and, if so, whether
the decedent designated the claimant as the recipient of property
passing by such will substitutes; 259 and written statements made
by the decedent, or oral statements made by the decedent in the
presence of at least one third-party, in which the decedent ex-
pressed the desire that her or his estate be used after her or his
death to support the claimant.26 °
Third, the court shall consider and give weight to any factors
that tend to demonstrate that the claimant did or did not engage
in care-taking with respect to the decedent or did or did not con-
tribute to the decedent's economic well-being, including but not
limited to the following factors: whether the claimant helped the
decedent cope with a physical or mental disability; whether the
claimant cared for the decedent during a period or periods in
which the decedent suffered a serious illness or attempted to
recuperate from an injury; whether the claimant helped finance
in some significant part the decedent's education or a business
venture of the decedent; whether the claimant performed a dis-
proportionate share of the uncompensated domestic services for
the couple's household; and whether the claimant contributed a
disproportionate share of the financial resources used to main-
tain the couple's household.
And finally, the court shall consider and give weight to any
factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant did or did not
rely upon her relationship with the decedent to the claimant's
economic detriment or in a way that fostered the claimant's eco-
nomic dependence on the decedent, including but not limited to
the following factors: whether the claimant sacrificed career or
financial opportunities or reallocated her or his financial or per-
sonal resources in furtherance of the parties' relationship or com-
mon good; 261 whether the parties relocated to a new community
together;262 written statements made by the decedent, or oral
statements made by the decedent in the presence of at least one
third-party, in which the decedent acknowledged a moral or legal
partners (77 respondents) included their partner as an heir; 40% of respondents with
opposite-sex partners (4 respondents) did so").
259 See infra Appendix A § (d)(3); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(f).
260 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(a).
261 See id. § 6.03(7)(e).
262 See id.
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responsibility for the claimant's financial well-being or a willing-
ness to assume such responsibility;263 whether the claimant began
to co-parent a child after the parties had agreed to co-parent the
child provided that the claimant was still financially responsible
for the child at the time of the decedent's death;264 the extent to
which the parties intermingled their finances, such as by main-
taining a joint checking account, savings account or money mar-
ket account, by making joint investments, or by incurring joint
debts;265 and whether the claimant's ability to maintain her or his
residence is jeopardized by financial consequences of the dece-
dent's death.
2. Monogamy and Fidelity as Factors to be Considered
Professor Waggoner's Working Draft lists the "degree of exclu-
sivity of the relationship" as a factor that the court shall consider
in evaluating the relationship between the claimant and the dece-
dent.266 There is a sound reason to consider including such a fac-
tor in my proposed intestacy scheme also. The exclusivity of the
parties' relationship is an indication that the parties had commit-
ted to the relationship and is some evidence that they "lived...
life together ...as a couple in an emotionally and physically
intimate partnership., 267
Professor Waggoner explains as follows his rationale for in-
263 See id. § 6.03(7)(a).
264 See infra Appendix A § (d)(4); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(1).
265 See infra Appendix A § (d)(2); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(b).
266 See infra Appendix A § (d)(1) (listing "the purpose, duration, constancy, and
degree of exclusivity of the relationship" among the factors that a court is to con-
sider in determining whether a relationship was "marriage-like"). Professor Wag-
goner seems to have borrowed this exclusivity prong of his multi-factor approach
from the court in Braschi v. Stahl Associates, Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). See
Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 77-78 (quoting Braschi). In
Braschi, the court examined the nature of the relationship between "two adult life-
time partners" for the purpose of determining whether the survivor of the relation-
ship should be entitled to remain in a rent-controlled apartment as a "member of the
deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant." Braschi v. Stahl As-
sociates, Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50, 54 (N.Y. 1989) (emphasis removed). The Braschi
court called for "an objective examination of the relationship of the parties," focus-
ing on such factors as "the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of
emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have con-
ducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance
placed upon one another for daily family services." Id. at 55.
267 Infra Appendix B § (b)(2).
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cluding the exclusivity of a relationship among the factors that a
court applying the Working Draft is to consider in determining
whether a relationship was "marriage-like":
Under most intestacy laws, if one or both spouses are unfaith-
ful, the survivor still takes an intestate share. When the par-
ties are not married, however, the behavior of the parties
forms the basis of the relationship, and such behavior shows a
weakened commitment to the relationship. This is not to say
that unfaithfulness during cohabitation precludes a finding
that the relationship was marriage-like. The degree to which
one or both parties were unfaithful, when it occurred, and so
on are just factors to be considered in the overall balance of
factors the court should consider in arriving at its conclusion.
To be found marriage-like, a relationship need not be like an
ideal or perfect marriage. 268
Elsewhere, in discussing his Working Draft, Professor Wag-
goner speaks of the relevance of "whether or not a sexual rela-
tionship existed and the extent to which the relationship, during
cohabitation, was monogamous.
269
I have several concerns with including the exclusivity of a rela-
tionship among the factors that a court must consider in evaluat-
ing whether a claimant should qualify as a surviving committed
partner. In discussing these concerns, and more generally in dis-
cussing the exclusivity factor, I think it helpful to distinguish be-
tween sexual monogamy and infidelity. Where the parties have
agreed that their relationship will not preclude either of them
from engaging in sexual intimacy outside of the relationship, such
outside intimacy (if it is within the parameters set by the part-
ners) does not equate with infidelity.
A court might find it helpful in applying my proposed multi-
factor approach to consider evidence of the exclusivity of the re-
lationship as that term relates to sexual monogamy. Where the
parties have committed to the sexual exclusivity of their relation-
ship, that commitment speaks to the broader commitment that
they have made to each other and favors a finding that the par-
ties were committed partners within the meaning of my intestacy
scheme.27°
268 Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 83 n.149 (citations
omitted).
269 Id. at 83.
270 See Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 14, at 54 (reporting that
26.7% of survey respondents with an opposite-sex partner and 45.1% of survey re-
spondents with a same-sex partner mentioned "[m]onogamy over an 'extended' pe-
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But I question the extent to which the inverse holds. That is, I
question whether the fact that two people who have cohabited
for at least three years have agreed to live in a relationship that is
not sexually exclusive necessarily speaks to any lack of commit-
ment by the parties to the broader relationship. I suspect that a
significant proportion of gay male couples who would self-iden-
tify as committed partners do not desire sexual exclusivity within
their relationship.
I also question the need to evaluate gay relationships against
heterosexual norms. I would prefer that an intestacy scheme that
recognizes unmarried committed partners respect that many gay
couples may decide for themselves that the sexual exclusivity
norm presumably accepted by the vast majority of married
couples is something they wish to reject. I am wary, therefore, of
including within a list of factors that the court must consider in
evaluating the nature of the claimant's relationship with the de-
cedent the exclusivity of the relationship, as one can reasonably
predict that this factor will disadvantage the survivor of a couple
that had rejected the exclusivity norm. My fear is that the con-
nection between marital relationships and sexual monogamy is so
close in the minds of so many people that many judges would
give disproportionate weight to the lack of such sexual exclusiv-
ity in coming to the conclusion that a couple's relationship was
not "marriage-like" and, therefore, was not sufficiently
committed.
Where the parties had agreed to live in a relationship that is
sexually exclusive and one (or both) of the parties was unfaithful,
the issue arises-what importance should be given to this infidel-
ity in light of the values that ground my proposed intestacy
scheme. Presumably, the answer would depend on the nature of
the infidelity-its duration and proximity or remoteness in time
from the decedent's death.27' The answer also might depend on
riod of time" as a characteristic of their relationship that made the respondent
define the relationship as committed).
271 See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 93 at 101. Professor Foster ex-
plains that:
Chinese courts give considerable weight to a wrongdoer's reform and re-
pentance even in the most severe cases of family neglect and abuse ....
Under an express directive from the Supreme People's Court, courts can
elect not to order forfeiture of inheritance rights if evidence indicates that
the wrongdoer subsequently "repented and mended his or her ways," and
the decedent "forgave" the wrongdoer during her lifetime.
Id. Professor Foster further notes that "[s]ome American jurisdictions take a similar
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which of the parties-the claimant or the decedent-was
unfaithful.
Where the decedent had been unfaithful, one might conclude
that the decedent's infidelity evidenced her lack of commitment
to the relationship.272 Furthermore, from this supposed lack of
commitment, one might infer a lessened likelihood that the dece-
dent would have wanted the claimant to take a portion of the
decedent's intestate estate. Thus, relying on evidence of the de-
cedent's infidelity, a court might deny the claimant an intestate
share of the unfaithful decedent's estate in order to promote the
decedent's presumed donative intent.
The decedent's infidelity would not negate the claimant's con-
tributions to the decedent's well-being during her life or lessen
the claimant's reliance interests where the claimant had sacri-
ficed in furtherance of her relationship with the decedent to the
claimant's economic detriment. The claimant might still succeed,
therefore, in making out a claim to take a portion of the dece-
dent's intestate estate (assuming that the decedent's infidelity
was not such that it caused the court to conclude that the claim-
ant and the decedent did not live life together as a couple in an
emotionally and physically intimate partnership). But in cases in
which an award to the claimant otherwise would have been based
on the decedent's presumed intent, considering the decedent's
infidelity in an attempt to be faithful to the decedent's intent
would come at the high cost of unfairness. Fairness dictates that
the party who has suffered her partner's infidelity should not lose
her claim to a portion of the decedent's intestate estate on the
basis of that infidelity.
Where the claimant herself had been unfaithful, the connec-
tion between this infidelity and the values that ground my pro-
posed intestacy scheme appears to be more remote. One might
make an argument that the infidelity is relevant in that it speaks
to a reverse reciprocity. The argument would be that the claim-
ant's infidelity inflicted emotional harm upon the decedent and
this behavior should disqualify the claimant from taking a por-
tion of the injured decedent's intestate estate.273
approach in cases of spousal or parental abandonment or failure to support the de-
cedent." Id. at 102 n.145 (citing N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law §§ 4-1.4(a) (McKin-
ney 1998), 5-1.2(6) (McKinney 1999) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-2(1) (2001)).
272 See Waggoner, Marital Property Rights, supra note 18, at 83 n.149 (arguing
that infidelity demonstrates "a weakened commitment to the relationship").
273 Kentucky and Missouri bar an adulterous spouse from taking an intestate
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In evaluating this argument, we might benefit from comparing
how infidelity is taken into account by a court that is adjudicating
financial issues-property division and spousal support claims-
upon dissolution of a marriage by divorce. 7 4 The Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act rejects consideration of marital fault275 in
the allocation of property and in the awarding of spousal sup-
port. 76 Likewise, the American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution reject consideration of marital fault in
both property division and spousal support - which the Principles
refer to as "compensatory payments." '277
share of the decedent spouse's estate where the adultery is coupled with abandon-
ment of the decedent spouse. WAGGONER ET AL. FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 35, at 81 (citing statutes in n.8).
274 No-fault divorce, which is the rule in all fifty states, permits a court to dissolve
a marriage without regard to whether or not either or both of the spouses has com-
mitted some act of marital fault - such as desertion or adultery. See Ira Mark Ell-
man, The Place of Fault in A Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 775 (1996)
[hereinafter Ellman, Place of Fault]. Whether the divorce court may or must con-
sider marital fault in making a property division or spousal support award is an en-
tirely separate issue. Id. at 775. See also Barbara B. Woodhouse & Katherine T.
Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82
GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994) (a "conversation" between Professors Bartlett and Wood-
house concerning whether courts should consider marital misconduct in adjudicating
property issues at divorce).
275 Marital fault and economic fault should be distinguished. Economic fault is
"misconduct that has affected directly the amount of property available for alloca-
tion." Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 776-77. All states permit a court to
consider economic fault in allocating marital property. Id. at 776-77.
276 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 307 and 308(b) (1983).
277 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS, Chapter 1: Introduction 42-85 (setting out the reasoning behind the
Principles' decision to reject consideration of marital fault). In an article published
in 1996, Professor Ira Ellman surveyed the law of the fifty states and reported that at
least thirty-two states forbid the consideration of marital fault in the allocation of
property. Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 782. Of these thirty-two states,
however, at least seven allow a court to consider marital fault in the awarding of
spousal support. Id. at 780. Five additional states that forbid consideration of mari-
tal fault in property division "may allow some very limited consideration of miscon-
duct with respect to alimony." Id. at 778. Conversely, no state that forbids the use
of marital fault in the awarding of spousal support allows its use in division of prop-
erty. Id. at 782. Fifteen states grant to courts the discretion to consider marital fault
both in property division and alimony adjudication. Id. at 780. Finally, Ellman cate-
gorizes three states as "almost pure no-fault states" in that they generally preclude
the consideration of marital fault in adjudicating either property division or spousal
support, but allow for a "slight possibility" that a court might consider marital fault
in deciding these issues in cases of very serious misconduct such as conspiracy to
murder the other spouse or serious violent assault against the other spouse. Id. at
779. The law of four states-that of Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
West Virginia-provide that a spouse's adultery is a complete bar to that spouse
receiving a spousal support award, irrespective of any other circumstances in the
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The ALI's position on the relevance of marital fault derives
from the theories that ground the Principles' division of marital
property and awarding of spousal support.27 s With respect to
property division, sections 4.09 and 4.10 of the Principles provide
generally that, at dissolution of the marriage, each spouse is pre-
sumptively entitled to one half of the marital property owned by
either spouse.2 79 This presumption of an equal division of mari-
tal property reflects a reciprocity-based theory that the amount
of property accumulated during the marriage necessarily reflects
the contributions to the marriage of both spouses whether in the
home or in the workplace.28 °
The Principles allow for an award of spousal support to com-
pensate a spouse who has incurred a disproportionate financial
loss upon dissolution of the marriage. 281 The Principles' drafters
reason that it is appropriate for the obligor spouse to compensate
the obligee spouse in light of the reliance that the marriage has
induced and for employment opportunities foregone by the obli-
case. Id. at 787 n.30. In many other states, a spouse's infidelity is merely an "appro-
priate consideration" for the court in adjudicating a spousal support claim. Id.
Professor Ellman theorizes that those states that allow consideration of marital
fault in an alimony adjudication but not in a property division might be influenced
by an acceptance of distinct rationales underlying alimony and property division.
Id. at 783. He suggests that some of the common law states, in developing their
equitable distribution schemes, have come to accept the community property notion
that spouses jointly own property acquired by either's labor during the course of
their marriage. Id. Professor Ellman further suggests that pursuant to this view, a
court might think of its role as dividing marital property between its two legal own-
ers, rather than as recognizing the equitable claim of an untitled spouse to the prop-
erty of the other spouse based upon the course of events during the marriage. Id.
Ellman concludes that "[i]n dividing property between owners the marital miscon-
duct of the parties seems largely irrelevant." Id. Ellman further notes that theory of
alimony has not undergone widespread reform, and whether to award alimony and,
if so, how much remains largely a matter for the court's discretion. Id. at 783-84.
"In a system with few bright lines, or even dim ones, it is not surprising that spousal
conduct would often be included, along with everything else, among the open-ended
list of factors that a court may consider [in adjudicating an alimony claim]." Id. at
784.
278 See Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 782-85.
2 79 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS §§ 4.09 and 4.10 (giving the principles for the division of marital prop-
erty). Section 4.09(1) provides that generally "marital property and marital debts
are divided at dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in value, al-
though not necessarily identical in kind." Id. § 4.09.
280 See id. § 4.09, cmt. c ("It makes far more sense to ground an equal-division
presumption on the spouses' contribution to the entire marital relationship, not just
to the accumulation of financial assets.").
281 Id. § 5.03 (listing kinds of compensatory awards).
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gee spouse so that he or she might care for the couple's
children. 82
The marital misconduct of either spouse is not relevant to
these inquiries into the reciprocity and reliance interests of the
spouses. 283 It is consistent with these theories, therefore, that the
Principles forbid the court from considering a spouse's infidelity
or other marital fault in the division of marital property or the
awarding of compensatory payments. Similarly, it would not be
consistent with the reciprocity and reliance rationales that
ground my proposed intestacy scheme to deny an intestate share
to an otherwise qualified surviving committed partner on the ba-
sis of that partner's infidelity.284
I have attempted to balance my concerns with allowing a court
282 Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 784. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05, cmt. a (noting
that the loss in earning capacity arising from assumption of primary caretaker duties
"is ordinarily incurred in the expectation that the marriage will endure and the pri-
mary caretaker will continue to share in the income of the other parent").
283 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REC-
.OMMENDATIONS, Chapter 1: Introduction at 48 (stating that "[m]arital misconduct
... would typically have no logical connection to the factual foundation upon which
Chapter 5's presumptions of entitlement are based"); id. at 66-67 (noting that prop-
erty allocation and alimony rules were not designed to measure or satisfy compensa-
tion claims for physical violence or emotional abuse); Ellman, Place of Fault, supra
note 274, at 785 ("Assessments of misconduct have no logical connection to the
factual foundation upon which Chapter 5's presumptions of entitlement are
based.").
284 Professor Ellman has considered whether the use of fault in an alimony adjudi-
cation might be appropriate to vindicate some interests other than reliance and reci-
procity. Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 274, at 785-86. He argues that
consideration of marital fault in such a proceeding can only be grounded in two
rationales: to punish the spouse who has engaged in misconduct, or to compensate
the spouse who has been harmed by such misconduct. Id. at 786. Professor Ellman,
for the most part, rejects both of these rationales. Id. at 788-92. But see id. at 803
(suggesting that it might be appropriate to adopt in adjudications of the financial
aspects of dissolution a forfeiture rule for very serious misconduct-such at the at-
tempted murder of one's spouse).
One line of reasoning adopted by some courts considering this issue incorporates
both the punishment and compensation rationales. In most cases of divorce, the
dissolution of the marriage results in increased costs arising from the need at dissolu-
tion to maintain two households. Some courts reason that these increased costs
should be borne by the party whose marital fault caused the breakdown of the mar-
riage. Id. at 788. Thus, the court punishes the wrongdoer while at the same time
compensating the innocent spouse. Professor Ellman criticizes this reasoning: He
argues that it is too difficult to determine if the marital fault actually caused the
marital breakdown. Id. at 788 (asking "[w]as the marital breakdown ... caused by
one spouse's adultery or the other's emotional insensitivity?", and arguing that
"[t]he court's answer tells us which conduct it finds more blameworthy, not which
functioned as the cause of the other.").
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to consider the sexual exclusivity of the parties' relationship and
my belief that such sexual exclusivity is compelling evidence in
favor of a finding that the parties enjoyed an emotionally and
physically intimate partnership. My proposal provides that:
If the court finds that the parties lived together in a sexually
exclusive relationship during their cohabiting partnership, the
court shall weigh this factor in favor of finding that the parties
lived life together in an emotionally and physically intimate
partnership. The court shall not otherwise consider evidence
relating to the sexual exclusivity of the parties' relationship. 28 5
My proposal would allow a claimant to introduce evidence
concerning the sexual exclusivity of the partners' relationship.
Only if the claimant chooses to introduce such evidence, would
those opposing the claimant be entitled to introduce evidence on
Of course, this dual costs rationale, which requires an inquiry into who is to blame
for the breakup of the marriage, has no application in the discussion of the appropri-
ate distribution of an intestate estate. The intestate's partnership has ended not be-
cause of the marital fault of either party, but rather because of the death of the
intestate. Therefore, the infidelity or other marital fault of the intestate or her sur-
viving partner has not caused a need for the maintenance of two households.
Professor Ellman further rejects the argument that marital fault should be used in
adjudicating the financial consequences of divorce to punish the guilty party who has
inflicted non-financial injuries on her spouse or to compensate the innocent party
who has incurred such non-financial injuries. Id. at 789-92. Such non-financial inju-
ries might include both emotional harm and physical harm. Id. at 790-91. Professor
Ellman argues that where the harm is serious, tort law (pursuant to such causes of
action as intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress and battery or as-
sault actions) is better able to punish the guilty party and to compensate the victim.
Id. at 791. "In short, a fault rule would serve compensation functions that may al-
ready be served by the tort law. Such duplication is inadvisable. There is no reason
to reinvent compensation principles under the rubric of fault adjudications, nor to
incorporate tort principles into divorce adjudications." Id.
285 Infra, Appendix B § (b)(2)(v). My proposal is silent with respect to whether
an intestate decedent might be survived by more than one surviving committed part-
ner, as the proposal defines that term. Given that my proposal does not require that
the intestate and a claimant have been in a monogamous relationship for the claim-
ant to qualify as a surviving committed partner, it would seem quite possible that an
intestate might be survived by two or more persons who could be qualified under
the multi-factor approach as a surviving committed partner. In such a case, the
court should calculate the total amount of property awarded to the surviving com-
mitted partners based on the duration of the longest cohabiting partnership period.
The court might then equitably apportion among the qualified surviving committed
partners that portion of the intestate estate so calculated taking into account such
factors as the comparative duration of the claimants' relationships with the decedent
and the comparative reciprocity, reliance, and donative intent values implicated by
each relationship. The task would be quite similar to the equitable apportionment
performed by a court faced with the competing claims on an estate of a legal spouse
and one or more putative spouses or simply multiple putative spouses. See supra
note 104-07, and accompanying text (discussing the putative spouse doctrine).
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the point. If the court finds the opponents' rebuttal evidence
convincing, the court will not weigh the exclusivity of the parties'
relationship in the claimant's favor. The court may not, however,
use a finding of non-exclusivity to justify denial of the survivor's
claim.
If my concern that some judges would give undue weight to a
lack of sexual exclusivity is justified, then it is likely that some
judges would find it difficult to ignore evidence of non-exclusiv-
ity in evaluating the nature of the partners' relationship, even
when the relevant statute directs that a court may not consider
such evidence. Some judges may not be able to unring the bell.
My proposal mitigates this danger in that it gives to the claimant
control over whether any evidence of sexual exclusivity or the
lack thereof will be heard by the court.
CONCLUSION
As an increasing percentage of persons in our society structure
family lives outside of the conventional nuclear family, family
property law is faced with the challenge of evolving to meet bet-
ter the needs of these non-conventional families. One approach
to reform would focus on form and would offer new objective
statuses for which family members could register and to which
inheritance rights would attach. This approach possesses the
twin virtues of certainty and ease of administration. The focus on
form would leave outside inheritance law's protection, however,
those persons who functioned as we would hope a family mem-
ber would function but who failed to register formally for the
necessary state designation.
An alternative approach to reform would focus on function.
Inheritance law would acknowledge as family members of a de-
cedent those persons who related with the decedent in such a
way that we think it appropriate to recognize the person as fam-
ily, perhaps because we wish to encourage and reinforce such be-
havior. The single most salient objection to application of the
functional approach in inheritance law has been the perceived
difficulty of determining, in the absence of a bright line registra-
tion system, who counts as a family member. Yet, the functional
approach is consistent with the recent de-emphasis of formalism
in succession law. And in principle, if the question is properly
framed and a court's discretion is properly constrained, the ques-
tion of whether the decedent and the claimant functioned as par-
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ent and child or as committed partners is no more indeterminate
than other issues that modern probate courts confront and re-
solve every day-issues such as whether the decedent intended
for a document that she failed to execute with testamentary for-
malities to be her will, whether she intended by revocation of a
will to revive an earlier will, and certainly whether she executed a
testamentary document with sufficient mental capacity and free
of undue influence.
With respect to the treatment of unmarried committed part-
ners, I propose a hybrid approach to reform that both offers a
registration option and utilizes a multi-factor test for function.
My proposal's registration option would offer a certain safe har-
bor for those partners who seek to protect each other from disin-
heritance. The multi-factor prong of my proposal would allow a
court to grant intestate inheritance rights to the survivor of an
unregistered partnership where the claimant shows by clear and
convincing evidence that she and the decedent lived together in
an emotionally and physically intimate partnership and that their
relationship profoundly implicated at least one of the three val-
ues at the center of the court's inquiry: respect for the decedent's
intent to provide at death for the survivor, or protection of the
survivor's reciprocity or reliance interests in the partnership.
My proposal seeks to constrain the court's discretion and nar-
row the question for the court's analysis by setting out twenty-
three factors relating to the values grounding my proposal that
the court shall consider in determining whether a claimant quali-
fies as a surviving committed partner. The accrual feature of my
proposal also promotes these values and reduces the uncertainty
that might arise from use of a multi-factor analysis in the admin-
istration of an estate. Based on the assumption that there gener-
ally is a direct relationship between the duration of the
cohabiting partnership and the degree to which the relationship
implicated the donative intent, reciprocity and reliance interests
at issue, my accrual method increases the intestate share awarded
to a surviving committed partner as the duration of the cohab-
iting partnership increases. The accrual method also serves the
value of administrative convenience: It provides a disincentive to
litigate in the difficult cases of a short-term cohabiting partner-
ship because the portion of the intestate estate at issue in such
cases will be small. 'Similarly, the accrual method reduces the
likelihood of a court making a costly "wrong" decision as to
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whether the claimant should qualify as a committed partner be-
cause the close-call short-term cohabiting partnership cases will
involve only a small portion of the intestate estate.
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APPENDIX A
WORKING DRAFT-INTESTATE SHARE OF COMMITTED
PARTNER, LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER,
JANUARY 20, 1995
(a) [Amount.] If an unmarried, adult decedent dies without a
valid will and leaves a surviving committed partner, the dece-
dent's surviving committed partner is entitled to:
(1) the first [$50,000], plus one-half of any balance of the in-
testate estate, if:
(A) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the de-
cedent; or
(B) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also de-
scendants of the surviving committed partner and there is no
other descendant of the surviving committed partner who sur-
vives the decedent;
(2) one half of the intestate estate, in cases not covered by
paragraph (1).
(b) [Committed Partner; Requirements.] To be the decedent's
committed partner, the individual must, at the decedent's death:
(i) have been an unmarried adult; (ii) not have been prohibited
from marrying the decedent under the law of this state by reason
of a blood relationship of the decedent; and (iii) have been shar-
ing a common household with the decedent in a marriage-like
relationship. Only one individual can qualify as the decedent's
committed partner for purposes of this section.
(c) [Common Household.] For purposes of subsections (b)
and (e), "sharing a common household" or "shared a common
household" means that the decedent and the individual shared
the same place to live, whether or not one or both had other
places to live and whether or not one or both were physically
residing somewhere else at the decedent's death. The right to
occupy the common household need not have been in both of
their names.
(d) [Marriage-like Relationship; Factors.] For purposes of sub-
section (b), a "marriage-like relationship" is a relationship that
corresponds to the relationship between marital partners, in
which two individuals have chosen to share one another's lives in
a long-term, intimate, and committed relationship of mutual car-
ing. Although no single factor or set of factors determines
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whether a relationship qualifies as marriage-like, the following
factors are among those to be considered:
(1) the purpose, duration, constancy, and degree of exclusivity
of the relationship;
(2) the degree to which the parties intermingled their finances,
such as by maintaining joint checking, credit card, or other types
of accounts, sharing loan obligations, sharing a mortgage or lease
on the household in which they lived or on other property, or
titling the household in which they lived or other property in
joint tenancy;
(3) the degree to which the parties formalized their legal obli-
gations, intentions, and responsibilities to one another, such as by
one or both naming the other as primary beneficiary of life insur-
ance or employee benefit plans or as agent to make health care
decisions;
(4) whether the couple shared in co-parenting a child and the
degree of joint care and support given the child;
(5) whether the couple joined in a marriage or a commitment
ceremony, even if the ceremony was not of the type giving rise to
a presumption under subsection (e)(3); and
(6) the degree to which the couple held themselves out to
others as married or the degree to which the couple held them-
selves out to others as emotionally and financially committed to
one another on a permanent basis.
(e) [Presumption.] An individual's relationship with the dece-
dent is presumed to have been marriage-like if:
(1) during the [six] year period next preceding the decedent's
death, the decedent and the individual shared a common house-
hold for periods totaling at least [five] years;
(2) the decedent or the individual registered or designated the
other as his [or her] domestic partner with and under procedures
established by an organization and neither partner executed a
document terminating or purporting to terminate the registration
or designation;
(3) the decedent and the individual joined in a marriage or a
commitment ceremony conducted and contemporaneously certi-
fied in writing by an organization; or
(4) the individual is the parent of a child of the decedent, or is
or was a party to a written co-parenting agreement with the dece-
dent regarding a child, and if, in either case, the child lived
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before the age of 18 in the common household of the decedent
and the individual.
(f) [Force of the Presumption.] If a presumption arises under
subsection (e) because only one of the listed factors is estab-
lished, the presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of the
evidence. If more than one of the listed factors is established, the
presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.
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APPENDIX B
AN ACCRUAL/MULTI-FACTOR APPROACH TO
INTESTATE INHERITANCE RIGHTS FOR
UNMARRIED COMMITTED PARTNERS
(a) [Amount.] The surviving committed partner of an unmar-
ried adult decedent shall be entitled to take the following portion
of the decedent's intestate estate:
(1) Subject to parts (2), (3), and (4)
If the decedent and the surviving
committed partner cohabited in a
partnership for a period of
at least 3 years but less than 4 years
at least 4 years but less than 5 years
at least 5 years but less than 6 years
at least 6 years but less than 7 years
at least 7 years but less than 8 years
at least 8 years but less than 9 years
at least 9 years but less than 10 years
at least 10 years but less than 11 years
at least 11 years but less than 12 years
at least 12 years but less than 13 years
at least 13 years but less than 14 years
at least 14 years but less than 15 years
at least 15 years or more
The unreduced intestate
share percentage is:
18% of the intestate estate
24% of the intestate estate
30% of the intestate estate
36% of the intestate estate
42% of the intestate estate
48% of the intestate estate
54% of the intestate estate
60% of the intestate estate
68% of the intestate estate
76% of the intestate estate
84% of the intestate estate
92% of the intestate estate
100% of the intestate estate.
(i) The decedent and the claimant cohabited if they shared the
same place to live, whether or not one or both had other places
to live and whether or not one or both were physically residing
somewhere else at the decedent's death.
(ii) The cohabitation period is the appropriate measure for de-
termining the unreduced intestate share percentage even in cases
in which the decedent qualifies as a surviving committed partner
by virtue of having registered along with the decedent as each
others' domestic partner in accordance with the State's require-
ments and procedures for the registration of domestic partner-
ships. The duration of the registered domestic partnership is not
the appropriate measure for determining the unreduced intestate
share percentage.
(2) If the decedent left one or more surviving descendants
who are not also descendants of the surviving committed partner,
the intestate share percentage shall be reduced by one-half.
(3) If the decedent is not survived by any descendant but is
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survived by at least one parent, the intestate percentage shall be
reduced by one-quarter.
(4) If the partnership between the decedent and the surviving
committed partner fractured prior to the decedent's death and
remained fractured at the time of the decedent's death, the intes-
tate share percentage shall be reduced as follows after and as
applied to the product of any reduction under parts (a)(2) or
(a)(3):
(i) If the partnership fractured in the year prior to the dece-
dent's death and remained fractured at the decedent's death, the
intestate share percentage shall be reduced by 50%.
(ii) If the partnership fractured more than one year prior to
the decedent's death but less than two year's prior to the dece-
dent's death and remained fractured at the decedent's death, the
intestate share percentage shall be reduced by 75%.
(iii) If the partnership fractured more than two years prior to
the decedent's death and remained fractured at the decedent's
death, the intestate share percentage shall be reduced to zero.
(iv) If the fracture of the partnership led to a distribution of
the parties' assets pursuant to contract or statute, the intestate
share percentage shall be reduced to zero.
(b) [Committed Partner; Requirements.] A surviving commit-
ted partner is one who, at the decedent's death, was an unmar-
ried adult, who would not have been prohibited under this
State's law from marrying the decedent on account of the blood
or adoptive relationship between the claimant and the decedent,
and who
(1) during the decedent's life registered along with the dece-
dent as each others' domestic partner in accordance with the
State's requirements and procedures for the registration of do-
mestic partnerships; or
(2) demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the
claimant lived her or his life together with the decedent as a
couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership
such that the intestacy scheme should protect the decedent's in-
terest in donative freedom, or the surviving committed partner's
reciprocity or reliance interests, by awarding to the survivor a
portion of the decedent's intestate estate. In determining
whether the claimant has met her or his burden of showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the claimant and the decedent
lived life together as a couple in such an emotionally and physi-
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cally intimate partnership, the court shall consider and give
weight to the following factors to the extent that such factors are
not excluded from consideration by part (v):
(i) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant
lived or did not live her or his life together with the decedent as a
couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership, in-
cluding but not limited to the following factors: evidence that the
parties were physically intimate with each other; whether the
couple joined in a marriage ceremony or a commitment cere-
mony; whether the couple registered with an employer as domes-
tic partners, if such registration was an option and would have
been beneficial; whether one or both of the parties nominated
the other as her or his agent to make health care decisions; the
parties' reputation in their community or communities as a
couple; whether the parties made joint gifts to charity together;
whether the parties celebrated holidays, their birthdays, and their
anniversaries together; whether the parties exchanged with each
other symbols of their relationship, such as rings or engraved
jewelry; whether the parties agreed to be buried after their
deaths next to each other or agreed that the survivor should take
possession of the ashes of the first to die;
(ii) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the decedent
would or would not have wanted her or his estate to provide for
the claimant after the decedent's death, including but not limited
to the following factors: whether the decedent devised property
by will or attempted to do so and, if so, whether the decedent
named the claimant as a devisee or attempted to do so; whether
the decedent utilized will substitutes to pass property and, if so,
whether the decedent designated the claimant as the recipient of
property passing by such will substitutes; written statements
made by the decedent, or oral statements made by the decedent
in the presence of at least one third party, in which the decedent
expressed the desire that her or his estate be used after her or his
death to support the claimant;
(iii) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant
did or did not engage in care-taking with respect to the decedent
or did or did not contribute to the decedent's economic well-be-
ing, including but not limited to the following factors: whether
the claimant helped the decedent cope with a physical or mental
disability; whether the claimant cared for the decedent during a
period or periods in which the decedent suffered a serious illness
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or attempted to recuperate from an injury; whether the claimant
helped finance in some significant part the decedent's education
or a business venture of the decedent; whether the claimant per-
formed a disproportionate share of the uncompensated domestic
services for the couple's household; whether the claimant con-
tributed a disproportionate share of the financial resources used
to maintain the couple's household;
(iv) Any factors that tend to demonstrate that the claimant
did or did not rely upon her relationship with the decedent to the
claimant's economic detriment or in a way that fostered the
claimant's economic dependence on the decedent, including but
not limited to the following factors: whether the claimant sacri-
ficed career or financial opportunities or reallocated her or his
financial or personal resources in furtherance of the parties' rela-
tionship or common good; whether the parties relocated to a new
community together; written statements made by the decedent,
or oral statements made by the decedent in the presence of at
least one third party, in which the decedent acknowledged a
moral or legal responsibility for the claimant's financial well-be-
ing or a willingness to assume such responsibility; whether the
claimant began to co-parent a child after the parties had agreed
to co-parent the child provided that the claimant was still finan-
cially responsible for the child at the time of the decedent's
death; the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances,
such as by maintaining a joint checking account, savings account
or money market account, by making joint investments, or by
incurring joint debts; whether the claimant's ability to maintain
her or his residence is jeopardized by financial consequences of
the decedent's death.
(v) The burden shall be on one opposing the qualification of a
claimant as a surviving committed partner to demonstrate that
the decedent and the claimant did not share physical intimacy at
any time during their relationship. If the court finds that the par-
ties lived together in a sexually exclusive relationship during
their cohabiting partnership, the court shall weigh this factor in
favor of finding that the parties lived life together in an emotion-
ally and physically intimate partnership. The court shall not oth-
erwise consider evidence relating to the sexual exclusivity of the
parties' relationship.
(c) [Standing to Challenge the Decedent Partner's Will. ] Unless
no other heir, aside from a claimed surviving committed partner,
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or no other group of heirs, not including a claimed surviving
committed partner, has a net pecuniary interest in challenging
respectively the decedent's will, or any individual provision in the
will, equal to or greater than the net pecuniary interest of the
claimed committed partner in challenging respectively the dece-
dent's will, or any individual provision in the will, no person who
would take less than 50% of the decedent's intestate estate as the
surviving committed partner shall have standing to challenge a
decedent's will, or individual provision in the will, by virtue of
the fact that the person is or claims to be the testator's surviving
committed partner. This provision shall not defeat a person's
standing to challenge a decedent's will where standing is asserted
on some basis other than the challenger's claimed status as the
decedent's surviving committed partner.
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